# 1NC

## FW

#### A. Interpretation:

#### The resolution is a proposition of policy – “United States” and “should” prove

Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

#### “Expanding the scope” means to create new statutory claims that go beyond existing antitrust standards

Richard Epstein 19 (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of Law, The New York University School of Law, the Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution, the James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law Emeritus and Senior Lecturer, the University of Chicago. SYMPOSIUM: Judge Koh's Monopolization Mania: Her Novel Antitrust Assault Against Qualcomm Is an Abuse of Antitrust Theory, 98 Neb. L. Rev. 241. LN)

The question then arose whether the violation of the Telecommunications Act counted as a violation of the antitrust laws as well. The statutory framework contained two key provisions. The Telecommunications Act was not allowed to preempt the operation of the antitrust laws: "nothing in this Act or the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws." By the same token, the status quo was preserved because the Telecommunications Act also did nothing to expand the scope of the antitrust laws. It did not create new claims going beyond existing antitrust standards. The creation of any additional antitrust standards would be equally inconsistent with the saving clause's mandate that nothing in the Telecommunications Act would "modify, impair, or supersede the applicability" of existing law.

#### Core antitrust laws refer to statutory laws – the increased prohibitions must be reflected IN Clayton, Sherman and FTC

Kuntz 2-23-21 (Kendall. MARYLAND CAREY SCHOOL OF LAW. Can the Courts and New Antitrust Laws Break Up Big Tech? https://www.law.umaryland.edu/Programs-and-Impact/Business-Law/JBTLOnline/Break-Up-Big-Tech/)

There are three core antitrust laws in effect today: the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act. These three antitrust laws attempt to protect market competition for the benefit of consumers. The Sherman Act outlaws monopolies and contracts that unreasonably restrain trade. The Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. Lastly, the Federal Trade Commission Act bans “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or practices.” Antitrust laws are not established to punish success, but are focused on preventing anticompetitive effects, exclusionary practices, reduced consumer choice, and hindered innovation.

#### B. Violation: the affirmative doesn’t

#### Reasons to prefer –

#### 1. Limits - Unlimited aff choice alters the balance of preparation, which structurally favors the aff because they get to choose all the ground for both teams - link ground and CP competion is eviscerated when the aff gets to choose from limitless starting points - their ability to radically recontextualize link arguments, emphasize different prescriptive claims prevents developed in-depth argumentation because there’s no way to track how arguments expand and develop

#### 2. Ground and Clash- debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics – and they allow the aff to cement their infinite prep advantage, because all they have to do is find evidence supporting an ideological orientation towards the world – this crushes clash because all of our prepared negative strategies are based on engagement with the resolutional point of statis. We lose 95% of negative link ground and the aff still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible

#### And, framing argument - vote for whoever does the better debating over the resolutional question — this does not limit argumentative styles, but tying those to topical advocacy ensures clash which is the only vehicle for education

## K – Black Marx

#### The rhetorical militancy of the affirmative is a veneer of radicalism that hides a deeper complicity with the ideological structures of neoliberal interest-group pluralism. It is an ahistorical erasure of class dynamics that undermines organizing for social transformation.

Reed 17 [Adolph, Prof of Political Science at UPenn, “Revolution as ‘National Liberation’ and the Origins of Neoliberal Antiracism,” *Socialist Register*, p.299-322]

Whatever it may have been at earlier historical moments, antiracism as a contemporary politics is not necessarily aligned with projects of broad social transformation animated by the egalitarian vision that prompted the twentieth century’s iconic revolutions. Rather, antiracist politics in the United States and elsewhere in the West and much of Latin America can be, and often enough has been, an antagonistic alternative to such projects of broad transformation. That is, notwithstanding a persistent inclination among leftists to consider it a discourse at least in dialogue with the left, antiracism is as likely now to be an ideological and practical programme that fits more comfortably within neoliberalism than with a socialist left. In the United States especially, but increasingly in Western Europe and Canada also, antiracism and other political tendencies based on ascriptive identities – that is, those expressing what one supposedly is rather than what one does – commonly reject Marxist and other socialist politics as insufficiently attentive, if not inimical, to the special position and needs of racial or other ascriptively defined populations understood to be oppressed in ways that are not causally or most consequentially rooted in capitalist political economy. In fact, these tendencies commonly object to the universalizing perspectives associated with socialism and Marxism in particular as Eurocentric (or phallocentric, or heteronormative) homogenization that denies the specificity of ascriptive groups’ distinctive perspectives, grievances and demands. To the extent the political orientation from which antiracist and other identity-based tendencies proceed is more ‘groupist’ than broadly solidaristic, the vision of a just society around which they cohere can be more in line with liberal interest-group pluralism than with a left that relates its lineage or marks its affinities to the broad tradition that generated the revolutionary movements of the last century. Eric Hobsbawm pointed to this tension in the mid-1990s indicating that, while the left naturally has supported movements advocating for the rights of stigmatized groups, identity groups ‘are not committed to the Left as such, but only to get support for their cause wherever they can’.3 Openness to this kind of politics stems partly, as Hobsbawm points out, from the left reflex to support the cause of the oppressed. The victories won in the second half of the twentieth century against ideologies and regimes of ascriptive hierarchy, chiefly those grounded on narratives of race and gender, made leftists, and labour, all the more conscious of past failings with respect to inattentiveness to, acceptance or even overt embrace of ascriptive inegalitarianism. The generation of leftists who emerged in the 1960s came of age with the militant anti-colonial movements and national liberation struggles in what was then known as the Third World, the civil rights struggle in the United States, and anti-apartheid struggles in South Africa, as well as the resurgent women’s movement. That generation was also likely to be self-critical regarding what were perceived as failings and limitations – some would say ossification, even debasement or perversion – of the dominant practical models of socialism in Eastern Europe and elsewhere on the capitalist periphery. The New Left generation’s inclination to criticize ‘really existing socialism’ extended also to the orthodox Marxist parties in the West, which were easily enough seen as out of touch with the new spirit of insurgency coming from youth, minority groups in advanced capitalist societies, and Third World movements of national liberation. In the US, many displayed similar scepticism toward the trade union movement, which in the eyes of many radicals had settled into a narrow, self-interested class collaborationism. This is a familiar story to Socialist Register readers, and one I summarize very schematically. In addition to Hobsbawm’s account mentioned above, Leo Panitch and the late Ellen Meiksins Wood have discussed these developments more extensively, especially the impact of the intellectual left’s movement both into the academy and away from an intellectual and epistemic commitment to class struggle.4 Several features of that moment are pertinent for making sense of the subsequent development of antiracist politics in itself and the left’s embrace of it. Disillusionment with democratic centralism and sclerotic bureaucratism fed a skeptical attitude toward organizational and intellectual discipline, as well as toward commitment to specific visions and programmes of social transformation. Those tendencies became exacerbated over the 1980s and 1990s as left activity retreated increasingly into universities. In that climate, as more and more of the left came to be defined by moral stance rather than strategic politics and practical programme, self-criticism and atonement regarding racism and sexism on the part of labour and the left in the past, and bearing witness against injustice in the present, loomed steadily larger as an element of left political discourse, especially in the US. And then, with rote repetition of ever more deeply embedded commonsense knowledge, the narrative of labour’s and the left’s past failings with respect to racial and gender inequalities was increasingly shed of nuance, to the point that in recent decades it has become a truism in some activist circles that failure to challenge ascriptive inequalities, or even active reproduction of them, has been a definitive characteristic of the working-class-based left and trade unions, and is substantially responsible for the decline of either or both.5 Commitment to the accusatory narrative can underwrite extraordinary historical misrepresentation, for example, Eugene Debs’s statement that socialism has ‘nothing special to offer the Negro’ [black people] is taken as evidence of his indifference to racial inequality – when his intent was exactly the opposite.6 A left that had by and large given up the goal of radical social transformation and the objective of pursuing political power for the purpose of realizing that goal became less distinct from liberalism. Such a left, as Russell Jacoby notes, ‘ineluctably retreats to smaller ideas, seeking to expand the options within the existing society’.7 Militant embrace of the discourses of identity politics, most notably antiracism, has helped to sustain an appearance that the left is not in retreat but remains on the cutting edge of transformational politics. That is because of the prominence of a view that construes ‘oppressions’ rooted in race and gender, etc., as both foundational to American society – or the West – and so deeply embedded that most whites/men are in denial about their power. From that perspective the civil rights movement’s legislative victories in the 1960s were superficial and could not address the deep-structural sources of racism and sexism, which are effectively ontological and therefore beyond the reach of normal political or social intervention. Thus the struggle against these sources of inequality is always insurgent because their power never diminishes. CONTEMPORARY ANTIRACISM’S AHISTORICAL CHARACTER Representing racism as a transhistorical phenomenon, sometimes characterized as a ‘national disease’ or ‘original sin’, underwrites a claim that it continues to shape life chances for blacks and other nonwhites as it did in earlier periods when, as W. E. B. Du Bois put it, ‘the walls of race were clear and straight; when the world consisted of mutually exclusive races; and even though the exact edges might be blurred there was no question of exact definition and understanding of the meaning of the word’, that is, when notions of racial hierarchy were hegemonic and were open and explicit principles of social and political organization.8 That view, to the extent that it understands racism as transcending patterns of historically specific social relations, presumes primordial understandings of race/racism as a phenomenon shared by both postwar racial liberalism and the earlier racial determinism it challenged. This is, moreover, a political problem as well as an intellectual one. The politics crafted in this antiracist framework has a rearguard character that is expressed in its proponents’ tendency to rely on evocation of past racist practices – law professor Michelle Alexander’s book The New Jim Crow is one prominent illustration9 – to mobilize outrage about injustices in the present. The argument by means of historical analogy, i.e., that current injustices that may seem to derive most directly from different, more complex sources are more significantly understood as like latter-day instances of racist practices in the past, rests on the trope that the current outrages demonstrate the deep continuity of racism as a force and at least suggests the inadequacy of the victories of the civil rights struggle. Yet that trope is also in effect an acknowledgment that big victories on that front have indeed been won. Otherwise there would be no basis for assuming that the comparison would have rhetorical force. Condemnation of an act or practice by comparing it to slavery or Jim Crow could provoke the desired effect only if we can assume consensus that slavery and Jim Crow were bad things. Moreover, sustaining the conviction that racism remains most significantly causal of contemporary patterns of inequality requires terminological gymnastics which enable positing racism – ‘institutional’, ‘structural’, even ‘post-racial’ – as, at least by default, the causal explanation for inequalities that appear statistically as racial disparity and are lived as such in day-to-day life. In fact, historical analogy typically stands in lieu of empirical argument to explain why we should automatically see contemporary disparities as evidence of the unspecified workings of a generic racism rather than as products of current and concrete political-economic processes that are very much ‘presentist’ elements of the regime of steadily intensifying regressive redistribution, the mechanisms, that is, that constitute the telos of neoliberalism. Assertion of the centrality of racist ideas and practices among labour and the left is similarly ahistorical both as a representation of the past and in its implications of continuity in the present. It is more allegory or fable than historical account. Presumptions, stances, and practices that now would be clearly recognized and negatively sanctioned as racist certainly were common enough in the Marxist left and the labour movement in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The appropriate basis of comparison – if one wants to make the sort of moral assessment that many critics of those institutions intend – would, however, not be early twenty-first century sensibilities, but whether racism and sexism were more prominent within unions and left politics than within other contemporaneous institutions. Frankly, from an historicist perspective this sort of exercise in moralistic calculation seems rather puerile, but, because antiracist criticisms of the left in the present depend so heavily on claims regarding the past, it is necessary to address them. Toward that end an important first step is recognizing that what race means and does not, how it has operated as a politically and ideologically potent category, as well as its meanings and significance, have evolved over time and context. The period of revolutionary ferment out of which the Bolshevik revolution emerged coincided with the historical moment when the race idea was at or approaching its apogee in the history of the world, before or since. At the beginning of the twentieth century race science identified between three and sixty-three ‘basic’ races in the world, including between three and six, or even thirty-six, in Europe alone.10 That ambiguity was the inevitable result of efforts to establish precise characteristics of a nonexistent phenomenon: ‘races’ simply do not exist as natural populations. Race theorists assumed that their efforts at taxonomic specification failed because generations of population movement and mixing had diluted original, ‘pure’ racial types; so they looked for racial essences beneath national or linguistic affiliations. This conviction in turn supported the manifestly unscientific approach of positing a priori ideal types and attempting to classify existing populations ‘racially’ by comparing the frequencies of geographical distribution of physical characteristics imputed to the ideal racial types constructed in the race scientists’ taxonomies.11 Marxists and other leftists were more likely to dissent from hegemonic racialism than others, but race-thinking permeated political and intellectual discourse and everyday common sense. It was reproduced among progressives, Fabians and many socialist reformers, as well as conservatives, in dominant notions of evolution as progress. Teleological presumptions about fixed stages of cultural and social evolution and the comparative method in Victorian anthropology that considered contemporary ‘primitives’ as living versions of ancestral Europeans reinforced the tendency – convenient for proponents of colonial expansion – to rank populations hierarchically on the basis of natural limits and capacities ascribed to them. And even many revolutionaries believed that colonial domination was justified because ‘backward’ peoples needed periods of tutelage to prepare them for the modern world. Many English race scientists were convinced that the indigenous working class was racially different from the aristocracy. Just as some socialists opposed imperialist expansionism on egalitarian grounds, others opposed it on racial grounds, expressing fear of degeneration through contact with racially inferior populations.12 Often class struggle was fought at least partly on the terrain of racialist ideology. In the latter half of the nineteenth century fights in the American West over importation of Chinese labour and Japanese immigration also centred around racialist ideologies. Railroad operators and other importers of Chinese labour imagined and openly asserted that those workers’ distinctive racial characteristics made them more tractable and able to live on less than white Americans; opponents, including the California labour movement, argued that those very racial characteristics would degrade American labour and that Chinese were racially ‘unassimilable’. But it was the employer class, not the workers likely to be displaced or impoverished, who established the debate on racial terms. Post-bellum southern planters imported Chinese to the Mississippi Delta region to compete with black sharecroppers out of the same racialist presumptions of greater tractability, as did later importers of Sicilian labour to Louisiana sugarcane and cotton fields.13 Large-scale industrial production in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries depended on mass labour immigration mainly from the eastern and southern fringes of Europe. The innovations of race science – that is, of racialist folk ideology transformed into an academic profession – promised to assist employers’ needs for rational labour force management and were present in the foundation of the fields of industrial relations and industrial psychology. Hugo Münsterberg, a founding luminary of industrial psychology, included ‘race psychological diagnosis’ as an element in assessment of employees’ capabilities, although he stressed that racial or national temperaments are averages and considerable individual variation exists within groups. He argued that assessment, therefore, should be leavened with consideration of individuals’ characteristics and that the influence of ‘group psychology’ would be significant ‘only if the employment not of a single person, but of a large number, is in question, as it is most probable that the average character will show itself in a sufficient degree as soon as many members of the group are involved.’14 As scholarship on race science and its kissing cousin, eugenics, has shown, research that sets out to find evidence of racial difference will find it, whether or not it exists. Thus race science produced increasingly refined taxonomies of racial groups, and the apparent specificity of race theorists’ just-so stories about differential racial capacities provided rationales for immigration restriction, sterilization, segregation and other regimes of inequality and subordination, including genocide. It also generated practical applications to assist employers in assigning workers to jobs for which they were racially suited. A ‘racial adaptability’ chart used by a Pittsburgh company in the 1920s mapped thirty-six different racial groups’ capacities for twenty-two distinct jobs, eight different atmospheric conditions, jobs requiring speed or precision, and day or night shift work.15 Of course, all this was bogus, nothing more than narrow upper-class prejudices parading about as science. It was convincing only if one shared the folk narratives of essential hierarchy that the research assumed from the outset. But the race theories did not have to be true to be effective. They had only to be used as if they were true to produce the material effects that gave the ideology an authenticating verisimilitude. Poles became steel workers in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, Buffalo, Chicago, and Gary, not for any natural aptitude or affinity but because employers and labour recruiters sorted them into work in steel mills. RACIALIST IDEOLOGY’S MATERIAL FOUNDATIONS As a significant social force, racialist ideology has always been anchored to material imperatives, in both domestic and international domains. It became commonsense truth to the extent that it connected with the perspectives and interests of powerful elites. Like all ideologies of ascriptive difference, it would pre-empt debate over evolving programmes of exploitation and domination by reading them into nature. While the discourse of white supremacy certainly has had no shortage of sincere adherents, it became hegemonic over the second half of the nineteenth century because it comported well with upper-class prejudices and capitalists’ economic programmes. That is how, as the Pittsburgh racial adaptability chart illustrates, it became the conceptual frame of reference within which other groups and strata came to understand their social position, articulate their own interests and thus constitute themselves practically as groups. In the US for instance, in the late 1830s and 1840s, in a context of rising abolitionist sentiment and the democratization of public discourse associated with the spread of universal (white male) suffrage, white supremacist ideology undergirded and propelled a shift in defences of slavery. Previously, pro-slavery arguments centred on defending the institution as a ‘necessary evil’, an unpleasant and even morally dubious requirement of the plantation- based economic order of the southern states. One antebellum planter put the matter succinctly: ‘For what purpose does the master hold the servant? Is it not that by his labor, he, the master, may accumulate wealth?’16 In the changing political climate, the rhetorical centre of gravity of defences of slavery shifted to an argument that the institution was indeed a positive good for all involved, including the enslaved. This moment coincided with the formation of the embryo of what by the end of the century would become race science. As the sectional crisis sharpened in the late 1840s and early 1850s, propagation of white supremacist ideology – both rhetorically and institutionally, through carrots and sticks – became important as a basis for accommodating non-slaveholding southern whites to the possibility of secession. Appeals to racial solidarity provided a narrative of political cohesion and negatively sanctioned dissent. To be clear, indicating that it had a material foundation is not to suggest that embrace of white supremacy was ‘purely’ instrumental, even among proto-race scientists and pro-slavery ideologues. An important feature of ideologies of ascriptive difference is that they hopelessly cloud the distinction between principled belief and pursuit of self-interest. Josiah C. Nott and George R. Gliddon, the authors of Types of Mankind, one of the most prominent texts of mid-nineteenth century race theory, both no doubt believed sincerely that the races they identified were equivalent to separate species and that blacks were naturally fit for enslavement. They were also, respectively, a wealthy slave-owning Alabama physician and an English Egyptologist who also wrote on the cotton economy in Egypt.17 A striking testament to the harmonizing power of ideology is the appearance of an antebellum field of slave medicine, devoted to identification and treatment of conditions peculiar to blacks. Among those was drapetomania, a ‘disease of the mind’ that afflicted slaves with an irrational inclination to ‘run away from service’. Samuel A. Cartwright, the slave-owning Louisiana physician who discovered and reported the malady in the early 1850s, when ‘positive good’ arguments had become dominant among slavery’s defenders, was convinced that he had identified a genuine medical condition, preposterously transparent as it seems to a twenty-first century sensibility.18 White supremacist ideology, and the racialism in which it was embedded, operated similarly, of course, in relation to European and American colonialism in the late nineteenth century. Pioneer sociologist Edward A. Ross in 1901 laid out an especially clear account that links scientific race theory, rooted in the neo-Lamarckian evolutionism common in the early social sciences, and an argument for imperialism and colonization as inexorable imperatives of the ‘vigorous’ races.19 In an illustration of the complex ways that hegemonic racialism could work, Ross had been fired from the Stanford University faculty the year before for having run afoul of Jane Lathrop Stanford, widow of Leland Stanford of the Union Pacific railroad and domineering force on the University’s board of trustees. Ross had earned Mrs Stanford’s ire for two particular transgressions: he militantly advocated, in league with trade unions, intensified enforcement of Chinese exclusion on racial grounds (Union Pacific was a principal proponent of importing Chinese labour, also on racial grounds); and he advocated with equal militancy public ownership of utilities.20 Rudyard Kipling, a literal product of British imperialism, extolled ‘The White Man’s Burden’, which – in a gush of enthusiasm at the US’s recent acquisitions from the Spanish- Cuban-American War – he urged Americans to take up. I am agnostic with respect to how earnestly Kipling held the brew of condescension dressed as altruism projected in his infamous contention. We can say with certitude, though, that he understood that there was much more to colonialism than altruistic tutelage. In response to Kipling, one of the most emphatic racists of the day in American politics, Democratic US Senator from South Carolina Benjamin R. ‘Pitchfork Ben’ Tillman, denounced imperialist expansionism on racial grounds, stressing concerns that sustained contact with inferior populations would lead to white racial degeneration.21 By the turn of the twentieth century racialist ideology had become a global frame of reference through which arguments about colonialism and economic and political hierarchy were commonly conducted. Therefore, it should not be surprising that opposition to those hierarchies would be expressed, at least initially, in that same language. An oft-cited instance of that perception is W. E. B. Du Bois’s 1903 observation that ‘the problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the colour line’, which he went on to specify as ‘the relation of the darker and lighter races of men in Asia and Africa and the islands of the sea’.22 In the US, mass disfranchisement of blacks and imposition of strictly codified white supremacist apartheid in nearly all the South made the colour line particularly salient as a bulwark against egalitarian political interests. This is consistent with how ascriptive ideologies naturalize contingent material relations of inequality by making them invisible within narratives of fixed hierarchy. The racialized discourse of tutelage, persistence of the presumptions of the Victorian comparative method, and direct and overt racialized domination all reinforced a similar understanding of the driving impetus of colonialism. It was reasonable for egalitarian opponents to assume either that racialist ideology was the proximate source of the inequality and exploitation, or that combating that ideology was a necessary precondition for attacking the inequality. It is noteworthy that both in the US and in much of the fin-de-siècle colonial world, as Du Bois’s colour line apothegm illustrates, the first tentative expressions of modern political assertiveness from the dominated populations were formulated within the paradigm of tutelage of the underdeveloped. The nascent professional and functionary classes in the colonies and the American South, the ‘new men’, as Judith Stein describes them, began to yield a stratum who pursued advocacy for subordinate populations alongside managerial authority over, and organized guidance of, their progress toward self-government. In the US that stratum of racial advocates, often describing themselves as ‘race men’ and ‘race women’, attained civic voice in the context of mass disfranchisement and shared a commitment to the large ideal of ‘racial uplift’.23 This established a recognized social role and occupational niche for the race or ethnic group leader as a sort of freelance broker or ethnic-group entrepreneur. Booker T. Washington and Du Bois were prominent voices of this stratum. Both in the US and colonial territories this politics of group advocacy often rested on racialist presumptions about the subordinate populations’ general backwardness and the stewardship role the group’s more cultivated and advanced members should play in leading the masses out of their benighted state. This was a petition politics that addressed governing elites as its principal audience because it understood them to be the only source of e ective political agency. That meant as well that the mission of group uplift was defined within parameters set by the ruling class. By the 1930s racialist ideology was increasingly under attack on biological, anthropological, and political fronts, in part as an expression of the left’s social momentum, which helped to buttress and disseminate egalitarian ideas and sensibilities. In that environment, the Great Migration from the Jim Crow South to big cities in the North and Midwest encouraged popular mass politics among black Americans, particularly as black workers were incorporated into the new industrial unionism. Mass organization as a political form as well as trade unionism also spread through much of the colonial world. In both settings, insurgent politics understandably joined opposition to racism with opposition to exploitation, as defences of those hierarchical regimes still depended on racialist arguments and would continue to do so for several decades. But the cultural and ideological victory of egalitarianism over racialism that consolidated in post-Second World War intellectual life came with a very large asterisk. What was largely defeated was the historically specific strict bio-determinist discourse of race that had prevailed as common sense between the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth. Walter Benn Michaels and Werner Sollors have shown that the retreat from race to culture in theories of social di erence that began in the 1920s was in some ways more an exchange of one metaphor of essential di erence for another than a rejection of the notion of essential group di erence. As historian of anthropology George Stocking, Jr points out, from its origins in the early twentieth century the modern culture idea never fully escaped race theory’s presumptions.24 In the postwar years, culture increasingly supplanted race in discourses legitimating inequality, particularly regarding exploitation of colonized societies and racial minorities in the US. In its taxonomy of ‘stages of development’, modernization theory in the academic study of comparative political development merely rehearsed hoary racialist accounts, such as that by E. A. Ross cited above, and the logic of the Victorian comparative method, while dressing them in a later generation’s scientistic raiment. Robert Vitalis has shown recently how the academic field and political practice of international politics in the US remained rooted in substantively racialist paradigms well into the 1960s.25 And the State Department’s and other national elites’ concerns about the impact that domestic civil rights agitation could have on US imperial designs in former colonial territories led to a concern with damage control that generated, on the one hand, censorship of news broadcast abroad and intense monitoring and policing of domestic activists’ overseas engagements and, on the other, liberal Cold Warriors’ pressure on the domestic front in support of some versions of the movement’s aims.26 AMBIGUITIES OF RACE AND CLASS IN POSTWAR INSURGENCIES Anti-colonial and national liberation movements also paid attention and to some extent drew inspiration from the postwar black American insurgency and vice versa. At least through the 1950s, movements on both planes of insurgency mobilized in general terms on a popular front basis. In both spheres – economic position and racial or national category – each signified the other. In the black American case, the postwar insurgency, which had germinated since the mid-1930s, incubated by industrial unionism and socialist agitation, was propelled partly by a tension between what Preston Smith characterizes as racial democratic (i.e., committed to radical equality of opportunity within American capitalism) and social democratic tendencies and programmes.27 Occasionally, the ultimate contradiction between those tendencies would erupt as open conflict around specific initiatives. However, in quotidian experience racial discrimination and subordination and economic exploitation and degradation seemed, and on one level were, elements in a singular system of oppression. For leftists in both loci of insurgency, pursuit of redistribution along racial and class lines each seemed to be a necessary condition for successful pursuit of the other, if they were not treated as indistinguishable. By the end of the Second World War, even very conventional black liberals and moderates were emphatic that continued growth of industrial unionism and expansion of public social wage policies were indispensable for black Americans’ advancement toward equality.28 For many, including activists, the social-democratic and racial-democratic imperatives were so tightly melded that, even on those occasions when tension between them erupted into explicit conflict in relation to specific initiatives, the sources of conflict typically were interpreted as deriving from individual, idiosyncratic differences rather than more portentous ideological contradiction. A downside of the popular front style of politics, which was very successful through the major legislative victories of the mid-1960s, was that it proceeded from an abstract commitment to the interests of the race as a whole as a governing norm for political judgment, which was by definition murky and facilitated evasion of those sharp, potentially zero-sum disagreements over political vision that would surface in strategic or even tactical debates. This murkiness left many popular front black radicals ill- prepared for a critical moment in the mid-1960s when the submerged class contradiction sharpened in debate over ways forward after the legislative victories against segregation. THE CLASS CONTRADICTION That tension in black politics was at its core a class contradiction; racial democracy is the social ideal of the aspiring professional-managerial and business strata. Failure, inability or reluctance to address class dynamics in black politics as such, while understandable in the context of dynamic racial popular front insurgency as a strategic desideratum or even simple oversight, nonetheless has had consequences for subsequent understandings of the relation of race and politics and assertions of the scope of authentically black political interests that eventually undermined possibilities for sustaining a working-class agenda in black politics. Antagonistic reactions from both antiracist activists and political elites to Senator Bernie Sanders’s campaign for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination, on a platform inspired by social democracy, threw into bold relief the extent to which what is now generally recognized as black politics is fundamentally a professional- managerial class programme that constitutes the left-wing of neoliberalism. This politics actively invokes the cultural authority of earlier moments of black insurgency, shorn of their working-class programmatic character, and spectres of the racial order it opposed, to align with a neoliberal ideal of social justice – parity in the distribution of capitalism’s costs and benefits among recognized ascriptive categories – as the boundary of the politically thinkable, even among a nominal left. This odd state of affairs is the product of several developments in postwar American politics, beginning with the impact of the business counterattack on labour in the years after the war and the aggressive anti-communism of the late 1940s and 1950s, and including the terms on which the victories of the mid-1960s were consolidated institutionally within black politics and the country at large. And, perhaps counter-intuitively, identification with Third World anti-colonial and national liberation movements in the 1960s and 1970s played a significant role in rendering invisible the class dynamics that shaped the thrust and impact of post-segregation black politics. The decade after the end of the Second World War was a key moment in helping form the trajectory that has culminated in contemporary antiracist politics in the US. Two linked pressures, one suppressive and the other affirmative, shifted the balance in black popular front radicalism sharply in favour of the racial-democratic tendency. The reactionary anti- communist offensive of those years, as was its domestic intent, stigmatized and suppressed expressions of socialist or anti-capitalist politics or critique. Its effects on accelerating purges of the left from the labour movement are well known. Leah N. Gordon and Risa Golubo have examined its impact on the strategic orientation of black politics and racial advocacy.29 Crucially, aggressive, putschist anti-communism and its ‘loyalty’ apparatus drove a retreat from political-economic interpretations of the bases of racial inequality and toward an individualist, psychologistic perspective focused on racism as prejudice, bigotry, or intolerance. On the affirmative side of the ledger, that new racial liberalism divorced from political economy encouraged a litigation strategy of challenging the codified apartheid in the South as violating the guarantees of equal protection against discriminatory state action provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. By the mid-1940s the federal courts had shown that that direction could produce positive results for litigants, and that potential opening impelled a focus on the segregationist southern order and its infringements on the civil rights of blacks as a class of individuals. Of course, segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment no more in 1954, when the US Supreme Court found state-sponsored racially segregated education unconstitutional by definition, than it had in 1896, when the Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson upheld codified segregation in the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine. Moreover, black activists had fought against the segregationist regime with whatever means available since before Plessy had established it as legitimate. What had changed was the political and cultural centre of gravity with regard to racial inequality and discrimination. To be sure, the social-democratic tendency in black politics did not disappear. It remained an important engine of popular political action through the 1960s. The fabled 1963 March on Washington was organized principally by labour leader A. Philip Randolph’s Negro American Labor Council, and was officially called the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, organized and carried out with considerable trade union support. The impetus for the protest in Memphis at which Martin Luther King, Jr was assassinated was a sanitation workers’ strike that was an outcropping of a regional organizing campaign of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME). Labour and class-related issues were central to much of the militant action that made up the high period of southern civil rights activism from the 1940s through the 1960s, as well as a two-decade long struggle – mainly outside the South, where ruling-class dominance was too complete – for local, state, and federal Fair Employment Practices legislation. This would extend beyond anti-discrimination efforts to authorize public intervention in labour markets to pursue full employment, which had been a central goal of black political agitation – and the black-labour-left alliance in which it was embedded – since the war years. Even in the South, however, as the Memphis case illustrates, labour and class issues were often as not high on the movement’s agenda. Even such proceduralist liberal staples of the anti-segregation struggle as restoration of voting rights were linked in the minds of activists and rank-and-file movement supporters to working-class and labour objectives. NATIONAL LIBERATION, BLACK POWER AND CLASS POLITICS As Cold War liberalism and postwar racial liberalism converged, activists increasingly tended to link the civil rights agenda to the Cold War international agenda, especially regarding the decolonizing Third World, characterizing southern segregationists as out of step with world opinion and harmful to national security. Thus, at the same time as politically attentive black Americans drew inspiration from and inspired decolonization and national liberation movements abroad, many also found it at least instrumentally useful to identify their domestic struggles with US international aspirations. Not many perceived that there was a possible contradiction between those positions. Black Americans’ identification with anti-colonial struggles rested on an almost unavoidable and a ectively powerful sense of common, or at least comparable condition. I recall, on first seeing the film soon after its release, finding the ‘Battle of Algiers’ immensely resonant; it seemed that I had lived some of it as a child and adolescent in New Orleans and other American cities. But that general identification was also in important ways superficial and naïve, and it would eventually become implicated in the critical defeat of the social-democratic tendency in black politics in the late 1960s and 1970s. Black American Third Worldism was more nationalist than revolutionary. Going back to Du Bois’s apothegm about the colour line – and it is much less known that he essentially recanted it by the early 1950s, specifically describing race as an ‘excuse’ in class war30 – black identification with colonized populations stemmed partly from an idealized racial nationalism that presumed white supremacist constructions of the stakes of western imperialism. Du Bois’s 1928 novel Dark Princess is a romance based on the premise of a global rising of united peoples of colour.31 In the 1930s and even into the war, many black Americans cheered on Japanese imperialism as a non-white challenge to white supremacy.32 The roots of the characterization of black Americans’ position as an instance of ‘domestic colonialism’ in the early 1960s lay in an e ort not merely to elevate the black insurgency’s power and significance through association with Third World struggles, but also to advocate a model of national liberation as a programme and approach for black politics in the US.33 Third Worldism was in general more a rhetorical phenomenon than a substantively programmatic one. Marxist revolutionaries on the capitalist periphery embraced it as an aspiration. Mao propounded a ‘three worlds’ theory, and Cuba still maintains the Organización de Solidaridad con los Pueblos de Asia, África, y América Latina (OSPAAL). Left governments in Venezuela and elsewhere have drawn on imagery at least evocative of Third Worldism and Non-Alignment in their e orts to organize regional and supra-regional (typically based on common export commodities) economic and political blocs. The Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (ALBA), with member states in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean, is arguably the most extensive and successful of those e orts. For the most part, however, the history of Third Worldism and the Non-Aligned Movement as predicated on the goal of global alliance of ‘peoples of colour’ – anti-imperialist or otherwise – has been very much oversold.34 Moreover, the view that non-whiteness provides a basis for transnational political alliance simply rehearses the mystification that colonialism had been driven fundamentally by white supremacist ideology. As Fanon observed early in the period of decolonization, that mystification, in identifying racial transfer of formal authority as the essence of national liberation, also obscured the extent to which imperialism was always first and foremost a class project, of which colonialism buttressed by racialist fables was only one historically specific form. In any event, as anti-colonial and national liberation struggles intensified in the 1960s against the backdrop of the escalating Indochina War, Western leftists, almost as a reflex, generally supported those insurgent movements and defended them against inegalitarian critics and imperialist state power; doing so was consistent with the left’s egalitarian and democratic values. Many of those movements contained different ideological and class tendencies, a complexity often obscured by their populist rhetoric, which posited claims to represent the authentic ‘people’. How class dynamics played out in national liberation movements that succeeded in winning independence and official self-determination is well known. Even several of those movements that embraced socialism and attempted to link the national liberation struggle to a popular class politics – e.g., the FLN in Algeria, the African National Congress in South Africa and those that came to power in the former Portuguese colonies in Africa – were ultimately incorporated into the logic of capitalist globalization in ways that articulated with domestic class contradictions.35 In the US, escalation of the war on Vietnam encouraged greater attentiveness in the left to imperialist interventionism, and over that decade armed national liberation or revolutionary struggles intensified in much of the former colonial world and Latin America. At the same time the Black Power nationalist embrace of the domestic colonial analogy and the discourse of national liberation gave a radical halo to what was, militant rhetorical flourishes aside, programmatically an ethnic politics fully incorporable with the pluralist interest-group system. Notwithstanding the sincere convictions of adherents, Black Power was, consistent with ethnic politics in general, very much a class-based affair, harnessing an abstract and symbolic racial populism to an agenda that centred concretely on advancing the interests and aspirations of new political and entrepreneurial strata which emerged from the victories of the civil rights movement and demographic racial transition in American cities.36 In relation to a history of racial exclusion, it was reasonable and appropriate that many leftists supported what was substantively a programme for inclusion on a racial-democratic model. And the rhetorical militancy and racial-populist symbolism associated with Black Power, including the tropes of national liberation, reinforced the sense that it was a radical or revolutionary tendency that leftists should support. For more than half a century that view of Black Power has obscured the significance of the mid-1960s debate in black politics over the movement’s direction in the wake of the legislative victories. On one side, a working- class and labour-based black radicalism, propounded principally by A. Philip Randolph and his associate and longtime civil rights activist Bayard Rustin, argued that the struggle for black equality faced new, larger challenges opened by the defeat of Jim Crow that required building a different sort of movement centred on the familiar black-liberal-labour-left alliance. In questioning whether ‘civil rights movement’ even remained an accurate description, Rustin argued, in a widely read essay published a year before Stokely Carmichael introduced the Black Power slogan to the world, that the next phase of the struggle called for expanding the movement’s vision ‘beyond race relations to economic relations’. He argued that it could not succeed ‘in the absence of radical programs for full employment, abolition of slums, the reconstruction of our educational system, new definitions of work and leisure. Adding up the cost of such programs, we can only conclude that we are talking about a refashioning of our political economy.’ For that reason, he contended: ‘The future of the Negro struggle depends on whether the contradictions of this society can be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces which becomes the effective political majority in the United States. I speak of the coalition which staged the March on Washington, passed the Civil Rights Act, and laid the basis for the Johnson landslide – Negroes, trade unionists, liberals, and religious groups.’37 This was an unambiguous assertion of the social-democratic tendency in black politics, which Randolph and Rustin followed up with introduction of a ‘Freedom Budget’ that laid out an agenda for realizing a full-employment economy and its benefits for the society as a whole, noting that black Americans’ circumstances would be improved disproportionately if the Budget were implemented.38 For a variety of structural and idiosyncratic reasons, their call did not gain social traction.39 Contributing to its defeat was that the racial-democratic tendency aligned more comfortably with new institutional opportunities made available by the Voting Rights Act, racial transition in cities, anti-discrimination enforcement and the War on Poverty, all of which constituted a class-based racial redistribution that comported with the material aspirations of the emerging, post-segregation black professional-managerial class.40 Incipient Black Power racial populism obscured the class character of those developments. Particularly ironic, in light of the subsequent development of black politics, is that many radicals successfully deployed racial populism, reinforced by allusions to anti-colonial and national liberation struggles, to portray the social-democratic approach advocated by Randolph and Rustin as a conservative ‘integrationist’ call for subordination to white interests. Because black radicals never had the political capacity to challenge for state power or a broad and deep popular base, the movement’s class tensions seldom surfaced in political debate. By the mid-1960s the racial-democratic tendency’s cultural force and institutional clout – including its incorporation within postwar liberalism – had made its commitment to racial redistribution practically hegemonic as the standard of justice and equality for black Americans. In retrospect, that moment marked the birth of antiracism as a claim to a discrete politics. The ambiguity and murkiness in black popular front radicalism regarding intra-racial class dynamics undercut the ability of social-democratic advocates to mount appropriate critical responses. For the most part, such advocates also fell back on a discourse of racial authenticity and objections that the strategies and objectives of the emerging political class did not properly represent the interests of the ‘community’ or the ‘people’. The conceptual limitations imposed by that fetishized racial populism testified to and reinforced professional-managerial class hegemony in black politics. Partly from ideological purblindness, partly from material imperatives, the expressions of political radicalism that purported to dissent from the consolidating new black class politics – openly idealist cultural nationalism, a new, anti-imperialist Pan-Africanism, and a potted Marxism-Leninism – defined their radicalism through withdrawal from mundane political dynamics and embrace of one or another flavour of millenarian revolutionary catechism.41 Some black radicals, particularly in the 1970s moment of the largely Maoist New Communist movement in the US, strove to meld their fundamentally nationalist discourse of national liberation with a Marxist anti-imperialism. The Black Panther Party had been an early expression of this inclination.42 However, that turn retained the crucial assumptions of national liberation discourse, especially the most significant one – the nationalist premise that posits the group as an authentically communitarian and singular ‘people’ united against external oppression, and represents the character of class struggle within the population (e.g., black Americans) as that ‘people’ arrayed against inauthentic ‘misleaders’ or a co-opted, comprador element. That view originated in the ‘domestic colonialism’ analogy that emerged from some radicals’ early 1960s identification with Third World insurgencies. The great irony of this apparently radical tendency is that the communitarian populism on which it rested worked mainly to obscure class dynamics within black politics. It is a marker of retreat from programmatic commitment to social transformation that many who consider themselves on the left accept the stance that racial politics is more radical or inclusive than class politics and that pursuit of socialism is suspect on identitarian grounds. Ascriptive identity becomes the primary basis for political commitment, and solidarity on the basis of who we are trumps solidarity on the basis of what we believe only when the left no longer has a transformative vision around which to cohere as a basis for political judgment. Antiracism does not have an affirmative agenda, a fact that complements a left that by and large has little clarity of social vision itself. Antiracist politics mimes radicalism with posture and performative evocation of earlier insurgent politics like Black Power radicalism in the US and the national liberation movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but with complete erasure of the class and political-economic tensions in which those movements were immersed. CONCLUSION Positing a singular black community or racial political aspiration has had long- reaching effects on black politics, and leftist scholarship on black Americans, that have facilitated accommodation to neoliberal imperatives often while intending quite the opposite. Proliferation of a literature that presumes a singular ‘black freedom movement’, ‘black liberation movement’ or even a ‘long civil rights movement’ divests black Americans’ political activity of its tensions and structural contradictions. The effect is to de-historicize examination of black politics. Politically, this tendency has obscured thirty years or more of steadily lowered expectations for what can be gained from political action. This was exemplified clearly during the 2016 campaign for the Democratic presidential nomination when in South Carolina, longtime Georgia Congressman and former civil rights movement icon John Lewis and his fellow black Congressman James Clyburn from South Carolina denounced the Sanders campaign’s proposal for free public higher education as irresponsible because it sent the bad message that people should expect free things – that is, decommodified public goods and services – from government. ‘Nothing is free in America’, Lewis snarled.43 Left-neoliberal exuberance surrounding the Democratic National Convention’s official nomination of Hillary Clinton as its presidential candidate made undeniably clear that antiracism and other identitarian expressions are more than simply compatible with neoliberalism but are most meaningfully active components of its ideological reproduction. Dara Lind, writing in vox.com, exulted that ‘a commitment to diversity has become the [Democratic] party’s unifying principle’, and Jeet Heer gushed in The New Republic that ‘the Democratic Party opened their arms to Republicans – without compromising their liberal values’.44 Identity and social liberalism in this happy vision will completely override the Democrats’ enduring class loyalties, and contradictions. There are two final ironies to note regarding the left embrace of antiracist politics. First, all politics in a class society is class politics. Antiracism is not exempt from that reality. What its proponents will not admit is that it is a class politics but not a working-class politics. Second, representing race as a primordial identity also elevates it as a social force above the dynamics of the reproduction of capitalist social relations; in that sense, antiracist politics of the contemporary sort proceeds from the same primordialist view of race as did fin-de-siècle race theorists. And that is also a case of argument by historical analogy coming home to roost.

#### The alternative is recovery of Marxist materialist analysis in the interrogation of anti-blackness and capitalism. Theory & praxis that orients itself toward working class organizing and collective activism is key and has been historically central to the black radical tradition.

Ferguson 15 [Stephen, Associate Prof of Liberal Studies at North Carolina A&T, *Philosophy of African American Studies: Nothing Left of Blackness*, p.7-14]

Marxism in Ebony Materialist Philosophical Inquiry and Black Studies In any academic discipline, there exist varying, oftentimes even conflicting, conceptual frameworks, theoretical approaches, and methods. Black Studies is no different. In light of the theoretical works prominent today, however, a number of students in AAS might easily conclude that philosophical idealism is the only school of thought. To the contrary, Black Leftist activists were significant players during the early period of Black Studies. The first introductory textbooks in African American Studies were written by Marxist/socialist scholars and activists; for instance, Peoples College's Introduction to Afro-American Studies and Clarence Munford's Production Relations, Class and Black Liberation: A Marxist Perspective in Afro-American Studies. Communist like Jack O'Dell and Robert Rhodes taught African American Studies courses at the Antioch College branch campus in Washington, D. C. And pioneering Black historian and "antibourgeois gadfly" Earl Thorpe - chair of the history department at North Carolina College - was recruited to teach courses on "Marxism and Black Liberation" for the Black Studies program at Duke University.23 However, today, Leftist thought is marginal to the politics and philosophy of Black Studies. Socialism and Marxism-Leninism are integral parts of African American history and culture. Of course, Marxist scholar/activists contributed to African American intellectual history and culture long before what is, in more formal terms, considered the advent of Black Studies during the late 1960s. In the tradition of Hubert Harrison, Susie Revels Cayton, Maude White Katz, Richard B. Moore, Paul Robeson, Oliver Cox, Eugene Holmes, Abram Harris, Claudia Jones, Walter Rodney, Angela Davis, and John McClendon, there is a need to bring the Black working-class-men and women-back into AAS. A materialist philosophy inquiry into Black Studies is grounded on three presuppositions. A materialist conception of epistemology and ontology presumes that there is a reality independent of our consciousness. A materialist ontology asserts the primacy of material reality over consciousness. And a materialist epistemology posits that this reality is knowable and knowledge or what is cognitive (social consciousness) corresponds to and thus ideally approximates this material reality. Lastly, a materialist philosophy presupposes that the social world is a stratified ontology of which class relations (i.e., social relations of production) form the ground for understanding social processes. The call for a materialist conception of science and epistemology should not be seen as a call for an essentialist ascription of AAS, wherein it is viewed only as a social scientific enterprise devoid of cultural studies. The current popularity of cultural studies, often in collaboration with various species of historicism and postmodernist trends, fosters a separation between cultural studies and social relations of production. As a school of thought, it gives less attention to the material conditions that give rise to African American culture and relativizes the objective character of the Black experience. In my estimation, the Black working-class has become lost in the whirlwind of cultural idealism. Contemporary Black cultural theory – under the spell of poststructuralism and Afrocentricity – has declared: class is dead! All that exists is intersectionality and a "matrix of domination," in which everyone is oppressed – women, men, capitalist, workers, children, ad infinitum. And there is a tendency in Black Studies to transform the Black working-class into some obscure gray matter known as the consumer, the multitude, or – my favorite from the "friends of the poor" – the Black underclass.24 The relevance and importance of the Black working-class must be brought to the forefront of Black Studies.25 This would entail discarding analytical notions such as "cultural deprivation," "human capital," "culture of poverty," "nihilism," "feminization of poverty," "intersectionality," "underclass," "cultural pathology," and "menticide" that have served to explain the contemporary and historical crisis that confronts the Black working-class. We must discard the cultural idealism of Maulana Karenga, Corne! West, Jawanza Kunjufu, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, Molefi Asante, and William Julius Wilson who perceive the "Negro Question'' as an ideological or axiological crisis, for example, as alienation from ancient African values, the loss of a "love ethic," or the lack of human capital. When we view the “Negro Question” as preeminently ideological, moral, or cultural, we ultimately discount the determinate role of material contradictions rooted in class contradictions. As Robert Allen astutely noted, " ... the question is not politics or no politics; rather it is which politics? Whom will Black Studies serve? Will it be truly democratic in its intellectual and political vision, or will it become 'apolitical' and acquiesce to a narrow, elitist and bourgeois view of education?"26 Black Studies and the Question of Western Civilization Revisited C. L. R. James wrote what could be considered a Marxist manifesto for Black Studies in 1969. Speaking at Federal City College, James argues, at the level of theory, that Black Studies should be anti-racist and anti-imperialist in character, but not anti-white. From James's perspective, there is no intellectual space in Black Studies for philosophies of Blackness in which ancient African civilizations, values, and cultural perspectives constitute a "presuppositionless beginning" for Black Studies.27 He parts company with Black nationalists and their contemporary progeny (e.g., Afrocentrists) who argue that every culture rests on a metaphysical, permanent substratum that gives rise to a particular system of thought. He cogently proclaims: We need a careful systematic building up of historical, economic, political, literary ideas, knowledge and information, on the Negro question ... Because it is only where we have Bolshevik ideas, Marxist ideas, Marxist knowledge, Marxist history, Marxist perspectives, that you are certain to drive out bourgeois ideas, bourgeois history, bourgeois perspectives which are so powerful on the question of the races in the United States.28 [Italics Added] For James, the antithesis between bourgeois ideology and proletarian ideology is essential to the development, direction, and aim of Black Studies. James is often viewed as someone who was head-over-heels in love with Western culture and/or civilization. Yet, it is important to note that dialectical and historical materialism (or Marxism-Leninism) constitutes the conceptual and theoretical framework for his assessment of "The Fate of Humanity." In a 1939 article, "Revolution and the Negro" James boldly avows, "What we as Marxists have to see is the tremendous role played by ~~Negroes~~ [black people] in the transformation of Western civilization from feudalism to capitalism. It is only from this vantage-point that we shall be able to appreciate (and prepare for) the still greater role they must of necessity play in the transition from capitalism to socialism."29 James's classic works such as The Black Jacobins and A History of Pan-African Revolt are ardently attentive to the fact that slavery, colonialism, and imperialism are part and parcel of capitalism. Moreover, the revolutionary resistance of people of African descent ostensibly indicates the critical role of Black people as actors or subjects of history and the dialectical development of Western civilization. In unswerving disapproval of Hegel's views about Africans and their place outside of world history, James meticulously documents and effectively demonstrates that-far from being removed from world historical event-African people and their descendants in the diaspora transformed the landscape of world history in a monumental fashion.3° Yet, James's historiography is not some form of racial vindicationism, which claims that ancient African civilization is the real source of Black historic magnitude and ultimately collective identity. Rather James offers insights into the Black struggles against slavery and colonialism as manifestations of the antagonistic contradictions within the modern (bourgeois) stage of world history. Cultural idealism has no place within James's worldview and consequently his philosophy of history. James's philosophy of history is not anti-European, anti-Western, or anti-white; his philosophy of history is stridently anti-slavery, anti-imperialist, anti-racist, and anticapitalist.31 James introduces a conceptual distinction between what is European and what is Eurocentrism. Moreover, he did not accept the abstract concept of the West as monolithic, devoid of internal class relations and contradictory class interests. Black sociologist Alex Dupuy points out that James's dialectical analysis takes into consideration the tremendous value of European culture and its influence on the African diaspora, and vice versa.32 Dupuy argues, "James was redefining the meaning of Western culture away from its Eurocentric understanding. For [James], West Indians were a modern and Western people, though they were not European, a point [James] made in many of his writings, e.g., his semiautobiography, Beyond a Boundary (1963)." 33 James resolutely rejected any outlook that requires Black Studies to be grounded on a uniquely formulated Black perspective (e.g., Senghor's Negritude or Karenga's Kawaida or Asante's Afrocentricity). Dupuy points out that James does not "reject African culture in favor of Western culture." 34 Rather, James's analysis is based on "a historical materialist understanding of culture" and the recognition that "the predominant influences in the Caribbean were those of Western Europe."35 As Dupuy insightfully notes, "The Black Jacobins remains ... one of the most succinct critiques of the barbarism of Western European imperialism but also of the promise of bourgeois civilization."36 Any philosophy of AAS worth its salt should follow in the "Giant Steps" of C. L. R. James. Embracing an ethnophilosophy that is anti-European is as fruitful as masturbation. It may be pleasurable, perhaps even therapeutic, but it won't give birth to a scientific approach to Black Studies. "And that Black Fist becomes a Red Spark" Black Studies and Black Working-Class Studies37 In a post-Cold War world, the "spectre of communism" has apparently been exorcised and laid to rest. There is the widespread belief that we have witnessed the death-knell of Marxism. So, why argue for the legitimacy of and necessity for Marxism in Black Studies? No doubt this has been a hotly debated question both in the Black Liberation movement and in Black Studies for a considerable time. I tend to agree with Brian Lloyd: "I presume that we are witnessing, not the death of Marxism, but the end of the first period during which Marxists managed to seize and, for a time, wield state power. That it has fewer adherents at the end than during other phases of this period, and that as many of them can be found in universities as in factories or fields, is neither disheartening as is imaged by some of its proponents nor as amusing as is supposed by all of its detractors."38 It has become the custom to summarily dismiss Marxism as a viable methodological approach and philosophical perspective for Black Studies. Most of the adversarial postures toward Marxism-Leninism in Black Studies have discounted the value of a materialist dialectical philosophy of liberation, class analysis, class struggle, proletarian internationalism, and the scientific socialist principle of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Despite the sharp divergence of their political views, Harold Cruse, Cedric Robinson, Cornel West, Marimba Ani, Patricia Hill Collins, and Charles Mills have condemned Marx and Marxism for everything from economic determinism to class reductionism to historical teleology and any number of other "conceits." We even find Asante making such puerile statements such as the following: "In fact, we have no history of a communist movement in the United States where communists put their bodies and lives on the line as African Americans did."39 Contrary to Asante's claim, scholars such as Mark Naison, Ted Vincent, Erik S. McDuffie, Gerald Horne, Carole Boyce Davies, Robin Kelley, Minkah Makalani, and Mark Solomon in addition to autobiographies by Harry Haywood, Hosea Hudson, and Michael Hamlin offer a much more nuanced picture of communism, socialism, and Marxism-Leninism in Black life and culture. Over the years, scholarship in labor studies and Black Studies has revealed the historical legacy of Black worker militancy. As we travel through the annals of Black history, we unearth Peter Clark's crucial involvement in the Great Railway Strike of 1877, Lucy Parsons's unflinching engagement in the Haymarket Square struggle, the heroic efforts of Ralph Gray, Tommy Gray, Eula Gray, Al Murphy, and scores of Black sharecroppers, tenant farmers, and agricultural laborers to organize the predominantly Black underground organization the Share Croppers Union, A. Philip Randolph's tireless efforts with the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, Ferdinand Smith's vanguard role in the National Maritime Union and Paul Robeson's monumental efforts to use folk music to entertain Spanish Civil War loyalists and striking workers as he gave support to international socialist solidarity. We could mention the steadfast leadership of Velma Hopkins and Moranda Smith in the 1947 strike at the Reynolds Tobacco Company in Winston Salem, North Carolina. There were Black postal workers like Cleveland Morgan, a member of New York Branch 36 of the National Association of Letter Carriers, who played a seminal role in the nationwide 1970 postal wildcat strike. We could also mention the historic efforts of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers to organize wildcat strikes in Detroit, Michigan. And, in more recent times, we could mention working-class Black women who have fought against the attack on public services, such as public housing and welfare. We should not ignore the fact that many of these activists were socialists, and quite a few were Marxist-Leninist in their ideological outlook. The scholarship of Clarence Lang, John Arena, Adolph Reed, Barbara Ransby, Rhonda Y. Williams, and Joe Trotter has demonstrated the historic importance of the Black working-class to African American history and culture. They bring to light the centrality of class struggle and conflict as determinate features of what makes up the Black working-class. World capitalism gave birth to the Black working-class. The initial accumulation of large sums of capital, which in turn, was invested in the exploitation of European workers, derived from the slave trade and the plantation system in the so-called New World. In volume one of Capital, Marx so famously wrote "capital comes dripping from head to foot, from every pore, with blood and dirt."40 The ruthless exploitation of Black bodies, in a manner of speaking, became the proverbial goose that lays golden eggs, possessing the magical ability to increase the magnitude of capital. Incidentally, the profitability of the "proverbial goose" prompted slaveholder Thomas Jefferson to remark, "it would never do to destroy the goose."41 Leaving the decks of the slave ship, "In the Name of Jesus," large numbers of Wolof, Mande, Fulani, and Mandingo were bound together by chains, from neck to neck and wrist to wrist.42 Out of the diversity of African ethnic groups a new synthesis was formed under the brutal system of capitalist slavery, giving birth to African Americans. The incessant "demand for Black labor" by Northern industrial capital and the plantation bourgeoisie fueled world capitalist development. Black slaves toiled in textile mills, shipyards, sawmills, and coalmines from Virginia to Mississippi. Black women labored on tobacco fields in the Carolina piedmont and picked cotton on plantations along the coast of Georgia. Black men like Tom Molineaux and Black women like Sylvia DuBois were given release time from slave labor in order to engage in athletic labor (as boxers) to bring entertainment and profits to slaveholders and the larger white Southern community. 43 From the seventeenth century to the twenty-first century, from slave plantations to auto factories, Black women, men, and children labored under the hard times of capitalist exploitation. The brutal forces unleashed by the capitalist drive for surplus value laid the foundation for the development of African American life and culture, from religion to music.44 Presently, we are witnessing, from New York to North Carolina to Missouri to Wisconsin to California, concerted attacks on public sector workers in order to resolve the economic crisis ravaging US capitalism. We cannot ignore the fact that Black people are prominent in the leadership as well as in the rank and file in a great number of these mass demonstrations. In cities throughout the country, working-class men and women, Black, white, and Latino, are being blown away by police officers who are ultimately protected by the rule of law. In the aftermath of the murders of Trayvon Martin, Michael Brown, Aiyanna Jones, Yvette Smith, Rekia Boyd, and Eric Garner, Black working people are not silently standing by while the "Lords of Capital" via their "special bodies of armed men'' – with military weapons and tanks – confront them in the streets. This seminal point is lost on Black critics of Marxism during the past 90 years. As numerous studies in AAS have demonstrated, the working-class is not one-dimensional, exclusively composed of white people. The working-class is composed of women, men, and children, in addition to being multinational in character. Marxist studies of Black working-class life and culture are needed now more than ever because in the souls of the Black working-class the grapes of wrath are filling and growing heavy. As Karl Marx so famously put it, "The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses."45 Philosophy of African American Studies, I hope, will serve a prolegomena to the Herculean task of developing a philosophy of AAS from the standpoint of materialism. How well I have backed up this reaffirmation of philosophical materialism and revolutionary socialism with good arguments I leave it to my readers to judge. But the attempt to do so provides an answer-satisfactory to me at least-to justify writing this book.

## K - Technofuturism

#### Pessimistic politics saps the utopian energy of modernity, fueling neoliberal abandonment of progressive democratic politics. This affective demobilization results in passivity and resignation.

Karlsson 14 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Theorizing sustainability in a post-Concorde world,” *Technology in Society* 39.1, http://bit.ly/2j6e614]

Certain in their belief that “ecological losses cannot be undone through the basic tenets of modernity” ([36]:245) as in the continuation of the rationalist-scientific enterprise, political ecologists seek to halt, and ultimately reverse, the structural processes of modernity. Running directly counter to prevailing socio-economic dynamics, it is not surprising that this effort has met with limited success. But by constantly emphasizing the ecological destructive tendencies of modernity while ignoring its long-term potential, political ecologists have been surprisingly successful in eroding our confidence in that science and technology can be used, in a conscious and radical manner, to ultimately overcome these destructive tendencies. By doubting our ability to consciously govern the future, political ecologists have drained the modern project of its utopian energies, effectively creating a passivity towards the future by which short-sighted market imperatives, rather than transparent democratic decisions and long-term public investments, become the determining factors. Instead of shiny fusion reactors and space travel, we are beginning to realize that the future may well be one of oil sands, offshore drilling, and increasingly destructive resource wars. Ironically, it may thus be that it is these feelings of passivity and doubt that ultimately will help create the very future that political ecologists fear. While few would dispute the more general claim that there has been a loss of confidence in our ability to democratically decide the long-term future ([75]; p. 6; [82]; p. 1), it would certainly be incorrect to attribute all of this loss to a relative small number of political ecologists, working on the margins of social discourse. But in their role as “truth tellers”, political ecologists have been able to tap into more general sentiments of estrangement that modernity has created. Capitalizing on the ontological insecurity arising from the acceleration of change in contemporary society, political ecologists have been able to project an alternative world of permanence and belonging. While such a world would also mean a foregoing of the existential freedom and mobility that modernity has given rise to [33], it is important to remember that for most people this is not about articulating a coherent social philosophy but about giving voice to a feeling of psychological bewilderment. In a similar fashion, while most people would, on reflection, acknowledge that humanity's lot has vastly improved over the last two hundred years, there are also legitimate concerns about the growth of conspicuous consumption, the emptiness of materialism, and the deep inequalities that persist, in particular at the global level. By articulating such concerns, political ecologists speak where others remain silent, an act which in itself has generated sufficient epistemic noise and doubt, not to reverse modernity, but to put sand in its machinery. Meanwhile, economic globalization has continued unchecked, lifting hundreds of millions of people out of poverty (most notably in China) but also fuelling resentment as labour markets have become ever more stratified. Instead of seeing the possibilities in new global forms of welfare capitalism, the Left has found itself helplessly watching as an ever tighter straitjacket has been sewn around its political ambitions. For the Right, the same straitjacket has been viewed as a “golden straitjacket” ([31]:104) thought to ensure prudent macroeconomic policies, monetary stability, and protect against economic interventionism. Although recent events may have shattered some of those beliefs, these “ideas still walk among us” [70] to a surprisingly high degree, largely because the Left has been unable to formulate a coherent ideological alternative. Arguably, the most important legacy of the last decades of neoliberalism has been its attack on the idea of a self-directing democratic future. Neoliberals have been particularly opposed to the idea that society should make “grand” choices or pursue different “utopian” visions of the future. Instead, neoliberals believe that the state should at a maximum provide the “framework for utopia” [64] within which individuals can then pursue their own conceptions of the good. In relation to modernity, neoliberals have sought to convey the impression that all its grand tasks have either been completed or proven impossible; that redistribution has been attempted but failed since the poor are not poor because of structural reasons but because of lacking individual ambition, and that the road to the future goes through privatization and away from the public as an acting political subject. Contrary to the historic evidence of how public scientific research has driven long run growth in modern capitalism [55], neoliberals have argued that most public investments are “inherently wasteful” ([12]:153) and have forcefully hammered home the message that financial markets alone are able to make wise allocation choices and that markets can accurately reflect all relevant sources of social risk. Again, it is easy to think that these beliefs should have been thoroughly falsified by the recent financial meltdown which, if anything, has proven that markets are particularly bad at correctly estimating systemic risks. Yet, even in these extreme times, the Left has shown a remarkable lack of political imagination and remained trapped in nostalgic dreams of its own past glories. Unable to invigorate the utopian energies of modernity yet equally unwilling to commit to their reversal, contemporary society finds itself in a state of debilitating disorientation [44]. In the West, in particularly in the United States and Great Britain, rifts in the fabric of modernity are beginning to show. Bridges in perpetual disrepair, decrepit concrete motorway interchanges, and chronically delayed trains are all products of a politics of decline. While some of these effects may be caused simply by an early entry into industrialism, they also reflect a deeper political paralysis, one that has been made worse by ever harsher demands for public austerity. Despite record levels of private wealth, we increasingly find that we can no longer afford to invest in the future. While the reactionary worldview has found itself in ascendance, the Left, tied down by postmodern quibbles, has become fundamentally uncertain about what purposes its politics should serve. In the imagery of this article, we can now more clearly see what forces that are defining the post-Concorde world. On one hand, we have the political ecological critique of modernity which has revealed the terrible ecological price that human development has exerted yet obscured its emancipatory hopes and long-term potential. On the other hand, as the neoliberal rhetoric about the inherent wastefulness of public investments has taken hold, we find the very idea of the future as a site of democratic choice to be under attack by far more powerful forces. Taken together, these otherwise unrelated ideological currents have to a large extent succeeded in destabilizing the modern project and replacing it with a sense of resignation and pessimism about the future. Although we remain haunted by fears of far-future catastrophes (it is for instance commonly acknowledged that the most devastating effects of climate change will not be felt until the end of this century), such long time horizons are not at all employed when discussing what possibilities humanity may have as we are emerging as a planetary civilization. This mismatch between problems and solutions reflects a profound uncertainty about the desired direction of change, an uncertainty which, this article suggests, may in fact be our most serious cause for concern. If it is correct to say that the post-Concorde world is characterized by a deep-felt ambivalence towards modernity, then it becomes important to spell out the implications of this ambivalence in terms of our prospects for environmental sustainability.

#### globalization and democratic investment in universal prosperity is the only way to prevent intensification of xenophobic violence and climate nationalism.

Karlsson 16 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalization,” *Globalizations*, http://bit.ly/2jS3RNS]

Every year, more and more people travel by airplane and are able to experience other countries and cultures first-hand. As the world gets smaller, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny our common humanity and insist on the artificial segregation of people based on mere geographical luck. Yet, in terms of politics or ideology, there has been surprisingly little interest in even imagining a world with universal freedom of movement and shared prosperity. It is reasonable to think that this disinterest in part derives from deeply entrenched Malthusian beliefs and fears of a coming climate crisis. Malthusian discourse often portrays global climate change as ultimate evidence of irresponsibility, greed or even the “cancer stage of capitalism” (Barry, 2012:138). Such descriptions show little tolerance for learning or humility with regard to the difficulties of the task. There has never been a blueprint for how to build a prosperous planetary civilisation or for how to achieve technological maturity in a way that does not destroy the biosphere. Yet, in a world of seven billion actually existing people, the question is where to go from here? As discussed above, to try to reverse the great structural processes of modernity through intentional localisation does not only seem wholly politically unrealistic, it is also most unlikely to actually deliver greater resilience or environmental sustainability. Yet, the problem of lacking realism is just as acute for those advocating breakthrough innovation or seeking to more fully integrate the world (Karlsson, 2013). In a time of public austerity, rising xenophobia, and an almost complete absence of realistic yet transformative visions at the global level, it is not surprising that climate nationalist responses have emerged as the default policy orientation. While these responses may at best slow the rate of warming, they offer little hope for the 3.5 billion people who currently lack access to modern energy and, as such, they are likely to contribute to the creation of new patterns of climate injustice. They are also problematic in the sense that for every year that a more meaningful response is delayed, the need for CDR grows. Already now, such negative emissions technology has become more or less a necessity for achieving the two degree target according to the scenarios represented in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) database (Anderson, 2015). Whereas breakthrough energy innovation could potentially offer a source of sustained global growth as energy would become significantly cheaper, CDR is always going to come at a net cost. If CDR eventually becomes unaffordable due to prolonged political procrastination and generally inefficient mitigation policies, it is likely that the political momentum will shift towards solar radiation management (SRM) and other more risky forms of climate engineering. Instead of fearfully backing into a warming future, there is an obvious need for bold and proactive political action (Garibaldi, 2014; Karlsson, 2016). Yet, as long as mitigation is perceived as a cost and something that runs counter to broader socio-economic goals, such action is unlikely. While accelerating the transition to a high-energy planet would undoubtedly put strong upward pressure on global emissions in the short run, it would also open up a political opportunity space for effective climate action that does not exist today. In a more equal and integrated world, there would be greater financial and human resources to combat climate change. Most of all, by providing a progressive account of globalisation, there would be a meaningful counter-narrative to both nationalist and neoliberal thinking. For some time it has become obvious that the welfare state stands at a disruptive juncture. Either it can try to protect itself from the world by imposing an international apartheid system as it falters under growing migratory pressure, rising costs for retirement, and a self-inflicted energy crisis or it can confront those fears with a politics of radical engagement and accelerate the transition to a world of universal affluence with an abundance of clean energy and open borders. Doing so would require reviving the belief in the public as an active political subject and defeating both neoliberal passivity and the divisive identity politics of contemporary environmentalism. To bring back high growth rates in the mature economies would require a fundamental reconfiguration away from supply-side economics to real wage growth, broad social investments, and accelerated modernisation (rather than as today, artificially delayed urbanisation and subsidies for low-productive jobs in rural economies). Finally, by providing universal welfare services, in particular education but also health care, social trust can be strengthened and corruption reduced (Rothstein, 2011) at the same time as the economy’s long-term growth potential can be increased. Yet, despite the remarkable scientific advancements of the last centuries, or even decades, Malthusians tend to reject the very possibility of universal affluence and what they pejoratively refer to as a “techno-fix” (Huesemann & Huesemann, 2011). Instead of uncertain technological innovation they like to see deep social changes, essentially a far-reaching epistemological homogenisation by which people everywhere adopt strict regimes of frugality and simplicity. However, just as the solution to the contradictions of capitalism in the 1930’s was neither individual moral reform of the capital-owners nor a socialist revolution of society as a whole but rather the institutionalisation of welfare-capitalism and liberal democracy, it seems far wiser to accept the existence of a pluralist society with competing conceptions of the good life and rather focus on applying technology in a conscious way to overcome environmental determinism. Obviously, this is also a question of political tactics. While ecosocialist literature tends to think of capitalism in the 21st century as a mere elite project, it seems fair to say that the logic of capital accumulation has become almost universal today with widely shared material aspirations reaching from home ownership to international travel. Similarly, large groups in the OECD-economies either have retired already or will do so in the coming decades with considerable expectations in terms of retirement income. Failure to deliver on these pension expectations would probably create a state of political crisis in which the “immigrants” but also the “environment” would be easy targets. For these, and many other reasons, it is not surprising that political elites remain deeply wedded to the idea of economic growth. Yet, insufficient demand due to rising inequality and a lack of social investments have made it difficult to deliver that growth. In the best of worlds, the need for growth could hypothetically make policy-makers more willing to challenge the prevailing supply-side paradigm but also consider the benefits of accelerating globalisation (or at least keeping them away from enacting protectionist measures). While it is obvious that economic growth does not benefit everyone equally, and that it can be source of environmental destruction, the same can be said about the lack of growth. A secular stagnation or even degrowth is certainly no guarantee for environmental protection or greater equality. If anything, the rich are likely to try to isolate themselves even more from the rest of society in case they feel threatened, in particular by moving overseas. It is also not surprising that the literature on degrowth has had almost nothing to say about how such strategies would play out at the international level (including what mechanisms that would be needed to prevent other states from taking military advantage of countries pursuing degrowth) or how exactly economic growth is to be “unlearned” at the micro level. Recognising the difficulties associated with imagining degrowth as an effective way of saving the global environment is not the same as defending “status quo” or embracing neoliberalism. As discussed above, it is the rather the failure of laissez-faire thinking that has made government intervention necessary to ensure both climate stability and a world with more equal opportunities. One common objection against climate innovation is that the real problem is not about limitations of renewable energy sources but about overcoming the entrenched interests of fossil industries. Yet, the fact that large multinational corporations such as ExxonMobil have vast political influence can also be seen as one of the reasons why technological change must be disruptive and go beyond, for instance,the scenariosin the IPCC database. Only by shocking markets through breakthrough innovation does it seem possible to break with the path dependence of existing energy systems in a way that would rapidly displace fossil fuels globally. In terms of strategy, it is also likely that fossil industries will be far more successful in thwarting the deployment of existing inferior technologies than in preventing a more general acceleration of science and technology, which would span multiple fields reaching from nanotechnology to basic physics (Victor, 2011:144) that are not immediately related to energy R&D and as such not subject to the same political economic constraints. In mainstream thinking, globalisation is primarily seen as a driver of environmental destruction as it disconnects “those who make decisions that generate ecological risks” from “the ecological victims who suffer” (Christoff & Eckersley, 2013:189). While few would dispute that globalisation has indeed contributed to the displacement of environmental harms as polluting industries have moved from rich to poor countries, a number of authors including Arthur Mol have argued that globalisation also has the potential of fostering environmental reform and facilitating ecological modernisation throughout the global economy (Mol, 2003). The aim of this paper has been to take that argument further yet by suggesting that the hope of an adequate response to many global environmental risks, and climate change in particular, in fact hinges on an accelerated rate of globalisation leading to economic convergence. A more equal and richer world would not only have better resources to deal with environmental stress and the need for climate adaptation, it would also compel policy-makers to actively pursue the development of breakthrough technologies that would once and for all resolve the climate/energy/population dilemma from the supply-side (Brook et al., 2014:2). By working from the supply-side rather than the demand-side, climate politics can finally be depolarised and the current logical schism between “believers” and “sceptics” can be overcome. Yet, it would be naïve to think that all would welcome a radicalisation of the modern project and the transition to a fully integrated high-energy planet. While such a future would probably reflect widely shared public aspirations to freedom of movement, material security, and environmental protection, cultural perfectionists are likely to decry the blandness of diversity in a world of open borders, eco-socialists are likely to see any “techno-fix” as merely a way of ducking responsibility for what they consider to be necessary social reforms, and libertarians are likely to criticise the government “overreach” implicit in the very notion of taking active responsibility for the global future. Another common objection against breakthrough innovation is that time is too short for fundamentally uncertain research. Such an objection would make perfect sense if there was any faster or safer route to restoring a safe climate and protecting the world against broader Anthropocene risks. This paper has argued that there is no such route, at least as long as the interests of people outside the OECD-countries are to be taken seriously. While sustained poverty abroad may seem to temporarily reduce the urgency of action, it will also lead to further lock-in of existing yet inferior technologies and increase the long-term need for CDR/SRM. The fundamental problem here is the scale illusion by which signals of relative local progress towards perceived “sustainability” overshadow other signals of absolute global failure. Just as the example of Iceland that currently has a 100% renewable electricity supply has not taken the world as a whole any closer to fossil independence, little if anything would be achieved if a handful of the world’s richest countries succeed in their transition to a nonscalable soft energy path. Yet, unfortunately, renewable energy but also the idea of “energy savings” continue to occupy a moral high-ground in the public imagination in ways that make meaningful action extremely difficult and obscure how much energy supply, but also overall consumption rates, must increase in the coming decades to ensure that everyone in the world has a chance of achieving a dignified livelihood. Essentially, by turning the traditional environmental idea of “intentional localisation” on its head, this paper has suggested that what most of all will determine humanity’s future in the Anthropocene is to what extent it will be possible to craft a new progressive narrative of global economic convergence capable of simultaneously overcoming Malthusian determinism and neoliberal ignorance of environmental realities. As Bruno Latour has noted, humanity has to learn to “love its monsters” rather than running away in panic from science and technology out of fear for the world that it has created (Latour, 2011). Only through a more conscious and reflexive relationship to technology is there any hope for humanity to realise its axiological potential (Bostrom, 2003) while building a world in which emancipative values, pluralism, and diversity can flourish.

#### The alt confronts the history of western colonialism and economic exploitation. A global Fordian compromise ensures oppressed people around the world the resources necessary to resist exploitation and flourish.

Karlsson 09 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “A global Fordian compromise? – And what it would mean for the transition to sustainability,” *Environmental Science & Policy* 12, http://bit.ly/2kfrsg6]

Though it may be simple to refute the normative and prescriptive elements of traditional green thought, we should be careful to think that we can do the same with its empirical analysis. The environmental problems are real and should indeed warrant radical political action. But any such action must first and foremost be based on the righteous claims for a decent life expressed by the developing world. Instead of seeing these claims as a threat to sustainability, the expansion of the global economy to the world’s poor should be seen as unique historic opportunity. Along those lines I will now delineate the idea of a global Fordian compromise. I will do this in a number of steps. First I will recapitulate the circumstances of the original ‘‘Fordian compromise’’. Then I will argue that even if economic globalization has been responsible for undermining the original compromise, the same forces may now be capable of renewing its relevance. With this in mind I will turn specifically to the agricultural sector and the European Union as an empirical illustration of how a global version of the compromise could work. By the early 1930s, the industrial countries were going through a deep and worsening recession. It seems correct to say that the crisis, at least to a large part, was caused by the very success of industrialism. The use of machinery and the division of labour had lead to a dramatic increase in productive capacity worldwide. At the same time, overall demand remained low, simply because the larger population could not afford to buy the goods that were produced. Historically, it had appeared rational for capital owners to keep wages as low as possible, to try to squeeze out that little extra marginal productivity through ever harsher conditions. This was also the analysis of Marx who thought that the declining rate of profit would lead to an increasing immiseration of the proletariat. Hence, for the more anarchistically inclined, the obvious solution was to overthrow the capital owners and divide their resources among the people. The problem with that approach however, was that the capitalists, albeit rich, were relatively few and the workers amounted to millions. What ensued, and what Marx famously did not foresee, was a new kind of compromise between capital owners and workers (Gourevitch, 1986, p. 128). In different countries, this compromise of so called ‘‘welfare capitalism’’ took on different shapes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). In the U.S. it was initiated by the capital owners, most notably by Henry Ford, who realized that it would be in ~~his~~ [their] own self-interest to raise salaries and by doing so making it possible for his workers to buy what they produced in the factories. In the Scandinavian countries, the same compromise came about as industrialists and unionists agreed to a peace accord on the labour market under the condition that salaries would rapidly be increased. Whatever its manifestation, the different compromises were unified in that they gave both sides of the labour market a vested interest in the future by pointing towards the long-term benefits of co-operation. Though the full effects of this grand bargain could not be seen until the 1960s, the ‘‘Fordian compromise’’ of welfare capitalism was indisputable the engine behind one of the longest periods of economic growth ever experienced. As material conditions improved, extreme poverty became more or less eradicated in many Western countries. Especially the Scandinavian countries showed that it was possible to combine a growth oriented market economy with a strong welfare state, at least as long as the total economic product kept growing in real terms from year to year. By the 1970s however, belief in the compromise of welfare capitalism began to fade. Increasing economic globalization had meant that wage increases were only possible to the extent that they were matched by real gains in terms of productivity. As companies became more export oriented, the purchase power of the own population also became relatively less important. Beside these materialistic explanations, there was simultaneously an ideological shift to the right, a shift that left classical liberals morally corrupted by the perverse idea that their future wealth was dependent on having more poor people in their societies. A similar kind of perverse logic was also replicated onto the international level. As globalization and trade liberalization made it possible to buy electronics, textiles and other consumer goods for remarkably low prices, many people came to believe that their own good life was somehow dependent on the hard and underpaid work carried out in other parts of the world. What such a belief failed to recognize is that the global economy is not, and has never been, a zero-sum game. Though consumers in the rich countries may benefit in the short run from low salaries in the developing world, the same is not true if we look beyond the immediate present. Then their interest would be much better served if these countries were transformed into advanced industrial economies and billions of new consumers would enter the global market. If the historic experience from countries like Japan and South Korea has any bearing, this would translate into a ‘‘race to the top’’ as growing wealth would allow automation and the substitution of menial work, which would then even further increase overall productivity (and thus, overall demand). It is in particular this possibility of automation and robotization that dependency theorists have ignored when insisting that global capitalism, as a system, requires poverty to function. On a political level, protectionists have repeatedly failed to offer a compelling alternative to this progressive vision, especially for the longer run. Not only does it seem morally suspect to deny poor countries the possibilities of economic development, the effects of artificially high prices also have to be borne by the own population while the allocation of resources into uncompetitive industries means less room for overall economic growth even domestically. Nowhere is this more evident than in the agricultural sector. Though the European Union is not alone in this regard, I will here take the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the European Union as my main empirical example to illustrate what a global Fordian compromise could look like. Initiated in the early 1960s, the CAP today represents 44% of the EU budget with a total of 60 billion USD scheduled in spending for 2008 (EU, 2008). The principal problem motivating the different subsidies and programmes of the CAP has been the high productive capacity of the European farmers. Left to their own, they would easily produce an enormous surplus of for instance grain, milk products and olive oil. In a normal economy, the effect of such a surplus would be a sharp drop in prices, forcing enough farmers out of business until the market would reach an equilibrium point where supply is matched by demand. Since the political price of such a ‘‘reset’’ (be it in votes, landscape aesthetics or food security) has been considered too high, the surplus production has instead been continuously taken away from the European market. Though it would have been possible to simply burn the surplus (as actually has been done occasionally in the U.S. Midwest), much of the European surplus has instead been exported on to the world market. However, since prices on the world market historically have been dramatically lower than prices inside the EU, this has in practical terms meant a large scale dumping of agricultural products on the world’s poor. At first, this may seem like a good thing. The European agricultural surplus has enabled for instance the urban population along the coasts of Africa to buy farm products of good quality, products that they otherwise would not have been able to afford. But as the population of Lagos, Abidjan and other growing cities have turned to food from Europe (which has been sold according to the ‘‘Ryanair-logic’’; better to get at least something than nothing) they have also turned away from domestic producers who find themselves unable to compete. Again, if the agricultural market would have been any other normal market, these African producers would of course have turned to Europe or other industrial countries with their products. However, and here we see the true cynicism of the current regime, this is not possible since one of the core mechanisms of CAP is precisely high tariffs on agricultural products entering the union. The import tariffs are set at a level that raises the World market price up to a ‘‘target’’ price consistent with that inside the union. Though attempts to reform the CAP are nearly as old the policy itself, and moderate progress has indeed been made as in the recent ‘‘decoupling’’ of subsidies (giving farmers less of an incentive to overproduce), the overall picture remains bleak (Goodison, 2007). Unfortunately, even the recent surge in food prices has been insufficient to stimulate larger investments as long as the high import tariffs of the rich world remain intact. Deprived of any chance of entering the world economy from below, and from thereon start building a capital base of their own, the African countries have instead found themselves increasingly dependent on different forms of development aid. Obviously, such cash handouts cannot replace indigenous growth and history suggests that they may often do more harm than good (Easterly, 2006). What motivates the CAP and similar policies is the very high discount rate by which the future is weighted against the present. Even if nearly all of the world’s economists agree that it would bring tremendous benefits to every country, and especially to the developing world, if the CAP and other regimes preventing free trade were torn down, the current path dependency may seem overwhelming. Calculations suggest that global free trade could generate benefits of up to $2.4 trillion annually. Despite this, the industrial countries have been backing into every new agreement on agricultural products and other goods in which the developing world holds a competitive advantage, as mostly recently seen in the stalled talks of the Doha Development Round. Given the apparent lack of political leadership based on an alternative long-term vision, we repeatedly see well-organized concentrated interests (such as the French farmers) prevailing over broader but more diffused ones. We do not have to look further than to the shores of Europe to see the practical implications of this failure. There, every year thousands of impoverished people drown as they make their desperate attempts to enter the ‘‘free world’’. What is needed, more than anything else, is pro-active political action. We have to take seriously the environmentalists’ claim that the future matters, but employ that insight to supersede the cynical trade-off that they implicitly and silently project. Just as capital owners and workers eventually came to understand that it was in their mutual long-term interest to co-operate, so must the interests of global development and environmental protection be aligned in a manner that opens up an optimistic vision of the future. To some this may sound like the very idea of ‘‘sustainable development’’, as outlined in the so-called Brundtland report of 1987 (WCED, 1987). It is. But since then we have come to realize that in order to be successful, the scope of ecological modernization must be far greater, up to the extent that it will be able to challenge the fundamental axioms of sustainability (Karlsson, 2007). At the same time, the ‘‘low energy paths’’ of the original report have been outstripped by the overwhelming demand of billions in Asia and elsewhere. It is no longer a question (as it was then) if these parts of the world will become industrialized or not, the question is rather by what means they will industrialize. Both China and India possess abundant reserves of coal. In fact, China alone has enough coal to sustain its economic growth for a century or more (Fairley, 2007). Unless breakthrough technologies, such as nuclear fusion, are made readily available, it is most likely that these countries will start burning their coal reserves on a massive scale, rapidly undermining any effort to reduce carbon emissions. Already last year, China became the largest source of carbon emissions worldwide. These alarming trends, should if nothing else, emphasize the need for radical investment in research and development. This brings us back to the Fordian compromise and the present situation with regard to trade and development. Within the framework of forward-looking progressive politics, it should be recognized that the advanced industrial countries have a specific moral responsibility to reduce their environmental impact (Hayward, 2007). But unlike in traditional green thinking, that incurred ‘‘ecological debt’’ is not be paid through reduced economic activity or, as often has been suggested in more radical literature, by some sort of ‘‘wealth transfer’’. To play the historic parallel a bit further, that would be the equivalent of asking a capitalist in the 1930s to give out his money and join the working class in their suffering. Morally commendable as such an action certainly would have been, it would obviously be foolish to base the hope of social development on its realization. By the same token, we should not let the hope of environmental sustainability rest with environmental citizenship or some ‘‘great awakening’’ by the time a global climate catastrophe sets in. Instead, the moral responsibility consists in compelling the half-hearted liberals of Europe and elsewhere to actually live up to what they teach in the economic classes. Witnessing the raise of China, South Korea and the wider Pacific Rim, it should be beyond reasonable doubt that the liberal market economy is uniquely equipped to lift billions out of poverty. Considering the number of successful economic transformations that the advanced industrial countries themselves have gone through over the last century, it should also be clear that the path to the future should be one that embraces openness, innovation and competition. Applying this to the case of the CAP, we should see the unique chance of striking a grand bargain by which the rich countries accept to wither the storm as their markets are open to competition. Following a removal of all barriers preventing free trade, the developed economies could initiate the long overdue transfer of resources from agriculture to scientific research. At the same time, the poor countries of the world would finally be able to begin walking the long road towards modernization, a road on which they have been held back for centuries, first by colonialism and then by the collective clientelism encouraged by the international development aid establishment. In line with a global Fordian compromise, that economic development would raise the purchasing power of the poor. Part of that purchasing power would be directed towards the already rich countries, allowing them to reap the benefits of trade and put even more money into technological development and socially progressive politics. Combined, it is likely that the total amount of resources will be sufficient to open up advanced technological paths to global environmental sustainability. Further examining the bargaining situation, we see that failing to reach such a compromise would worsen international tensions, keeping the industrial countries in their oppressing role in which short-term gains are bought at the expense of long-term possibilities. Moreover, and if airy cosmopolitan arguments are insufficient to persuade us about our shared destiny, we have to remember that if poor states are allowed to fail they stand the risk of becoming breeding grounds for terror and extremism, all imposing skyrocketing costs for ‘‘security’’ on the developed world. Thus, though the analogy with the striking working class of the original compromise may not be perfect, the rich countries should have a strong incentive to listen to the warning sounds coming from the ‘‘lower decks’’.

## Case

### 1NC - Adversarialism Turn

#### The adversarial structure of debate turns aff solvency

Atchison and Panetta ‘9 [Jarrod Atchison, Director of Debate @ Trinity University, and Edward Panetta, Director of Debate @ the University of Georgia, Intercollegiate Debate and Speech Communication: Issues for the Future, p. 317-34 //liam]

The larger problem with locating the “debate as activism” perspective within the competitive framework is that it overlooks the communal nature of the community problem. If each individual debate is a decision about how the debate community should approach a problem, then the losing debaters become collateral damage in the activist strategy dedicated toward creating community change. One frustrating example of this type of argument might include a judge voting for an activist team in an effort to help them reach elimination rounds to generate a community discussion about the problem. Under this scenario, the losing team serves as a sacrificial lamb on the altar of community change. Downplaying the important role of competition and treating opponents as scapegoats for the failures of the community may increase the profile of the winning team and the community problem, but it does little to generate the critical coalitions necessary to address the community problem, because the competitive focus **encourages teams to concentrate on how to beat the strategy with little regard for addressing the community problem**. There is no role for competition when a judge decides that it is important to accentuate the publicity of a community problem. An extreme example might include a team arguing that their opponents’ academic institution had a legacy of civil rights abuses and that the judge should not vote for them because that would be a community endorsement of a problematic institution. This scenario is a bit more outlandish but not unreasonable if one assumes that each debate should be about what is best for promoting solutions to diversity problems in the debate community.¶ If the debate community is serious about generating community change, then it is more likely to occur outside a traditional competitive debate. When a team loses a debate because the judge decides that it is better for the community for the other team to win, then they have sacrificed two potential advocates for change within the community. Creating change through wins generates backlash through losses. Some proponents are comfortable with generating backlash and argue that the reaction is evidence that the issue is being discussed.¶ From our perspective, the discussion that results from these hostile situations is not a productive one where participants seek to work together for a common goal. Instead of giving up on hope for change and agitating for wins regardless of who is left behind, it seems more reasonable that the debate community should try the method of public argument that we teach in an effort to generate a discussion of necessary community changes. Simply put, debate competitions do not represent the best environment for community change because it is a competition for a win and only one team can win any given debate, whereas addressing systemic century-long community problems requires a tremendous effort by a great number of people.

### 1NC - Academy Turn

#### Positioning within the structure of debate and the academy subverts the radical intentions of the Aff – their resistance becomes an object of surveillance and consumption.

Phillips 99 – Dr. Kendall R. Phillips, Professor of Communication at Central Missouri State University, PhD in Speech Communication from Pennsylvania State University, MA in Speech Communication from Central Missouri State University, BS in Psychology and Sociology from Southwest Baptist University, “Rhetoric, Resistance, and Criticism: A Response to Sloop and Ono”, Philosophy & Rhetoric, Volume 32, Number 1, p. 96-101

My concern with this movement centers around an issue that Sloop and Ono seem to take as a given, namely, the role of the critic. On one hand, calling for the systematic investigation of existing marginalized discourses is a natural extension both of critical rhetoric (see McKerrow 1989, 1991) and of the general ideological turn in criticism (see Wander 1983). On the other hand, the ease of transition from criticism in the service of resistance to criticism of resistance may obscure the need to address some fundamental issues regarding the general function of rhetorical criticism in an uncertain and contentious world. Beyond licensing the critic to engage in political struggle, Sloop and Ono advocate the pursuit of covert resistant discourses. Such a move not only stretches our understanding of rhetoric and criticism, but also alters significantly the relationship between critic and out- law. Critical interrogation of dominant discursive practices in the service of political/cultural reform is supplanted in favor of positioning covert out- law communities as objects of investigation. Invited to seek out subversive discourses, the critic is positioned as the active agent of change and the out-law discourse becomes merely instrumental. Rather than academic criticism acting in service of everyday acts of resistance, everyday acts of resistance are put into the service of academic criticism. Rhetorical resistance That we are "caught within conflicting logics of justice that are culturally struggled over" (Sloop and Ono 1997, 50) and that rhetoric is employed in these struggles seems an uncontroversial statement. Despite the theoretical miasma surrounding judgment, Sloop and Ono accurately note, the material process of rendering judgments (and of disputing the logics of litigation) continues in the world of actually practiced discourse. In the materially contested world, rhetoric is utilized both by those seeking to secure the grounds of dominant judgment and by those seeking to undermine or supplant dominant cultural logics with some out-law notion of justice. The distinction between these two cultural groups, "in-law" and out- law, however, deserves some consideration prior to any discussion of the role of the critic as implied in the out-law discourse project. The discourse of the dominant or those within the bounds of superordinate logics of litigation is reminiscent of Michel De Certeau's (1984) strategic discourse. For De Certeau, strategies are utilized by those who have authority by virtue of their proper position. Strategies exploit the institutionally guaranteed background consensus by which power relations (and litigations) are maintained and advanced. In contrast, tactics are utilized by those having no proper place of authority within the discursive economy who must seek opportunities whereby the discourse of the dominant might be undermined and contested. To extend Sloop and Ono's definition, out-law discourses are those that can (and, by their analysis, do) take advantage of situations (e.g., race riots) to disrupt the regularity of dominant cultural groups. The ongoing struggle between strategically instituted cultural dominants and the "out-law always lurk[ing] in the distance" (66) is acknowledged, even celebrated, by Sloop and Ono. What their acknowledgment fails to provide, however, is a clear need for critical intervention. Indeed, quite the reverse is presented: It is the critic (particularly the left-leaning critic) who needs out-law discourse. While the struggles over justice, equality, and freedom have gone on, the left-leaning critics are those who have theoretically excluded themselves from the disputes. The study of out-law dis- courses, then, provides a means to reinvigorate the intellectual and re-institute (academic) leftist thinking into popular political struggles (53-54). Thus, Sloop and Ono's project incorporates three types of rhetoric: the rhetoric of the in-law, presumably the traditional object of critical attention; the rhetoric of the out-law, the study of which may transform our understanding of judgment as well as reinvigorate leftist democratic critiques; and the rhetoric of the critics who, having lost their political po- tency, can exploit the discourse of the out-law to promote ideological struggles. It is to this critical rhetoric that I now turn. Resistance criticism Sloop and Ono (1997) clearly state the relationship they envision between the rhetorical critic and out-law discourse: "Ultimately, we will argue that the role of critical rhetoricians is to produce 'materialist conceptions of judgment,' using out-law judgments to disrupt dominant logics of judgment" (54; emphasis added). Here the critic seeks out vernacular discourse (60), focuses on the methods and values embodied in these communities (62), listens to and evaluates the out-law community (62-63), and chooses appropriate discourses for the purpose of disrupting dominant practices (63). Essentially, it is the critic who seeks out marginalized discourses and returns them to the center for the purpose of provoking dominant cultural groups (63). Despite acknowledging the efficacy of out-law discourses, Sloop and Ono assume that the critiques generated and presented by the out-law community have only minimal effect. The irony, and indeed arrogance, of this assumption is evident when they claim: "There are cases, however, when, without the prompting of academic critics, out-law discourses serve local purposes at times and at others resonate within dominant discourses, disrupting sedimented ways of thinking, transforming dominant forms of judgment" (60; emphasis added). Sloop and Ono seem to suggest that such locally generated critiques are the exception, whereas the political efficacy of the academic critic is the rule. This seems an odd claim, given that the justification for their out-law discourse project is the lack of politically viable academic critique and the perceived potency of out-law conceptions of judgment. Their suggestion that out-law communities are in need of the academic critic contradicts not only the already disruptive nature of existing out-law discourses (the grounds for using out-law discourse), but also the impotence of contemporary critical discourse (the warrant for studying out-law discourse). By this I do not mean that the critiques and theories generated by academically instituted intellectuals have not been incorporated into subversive discourses. Just as out-law discourses inevitably mount critiques of dominant logics, so, too, the perspectives on rhetoric and criticism generated by academics are used in resistance movements. Feminist critiques of patriarchy, queer theories of homophobia, postcolonial interrogations of race have found their way into the service of resistant groups. The key distinction I wish to make is that the existence of criticism (academic or self-generated) in resistance does not necessitate Sloop and Ono's move to a criticism of resistance. What Sloop and Ono fail to offer is an adequate argument for "taking public speaking out of the streets and studying it in the classroom, for treating it less as an expression of protest" (Wander 1983, 3) and more as an object for analysis and reproduction within the political economy of the academy. Philip Wander made a similar charge against Herbert Wicheln's early critical project, and this concern should remain at the forefront of any discussion aimed at expanding the scope and function of criticism. Sloop and Ono offer numerous directives for the critic without addressing whether the critic should be examining out-law discourses in the first place. While it is too early to suggest any definitive answer to the question of criticism of resistance, some preliminary arguments as to why critics should not pursue out-law discourses can be offered: (1) Hidden out-law discourses may have good reasons to stay hidden. Sloop and Ono specifically instruct us that "the logic of the out-law must constantly be searched for, brought forth" (66) and used to disrupt dominant practices. But are we to believe that all out-law discourses are prepared to mount such a challenge to the dominant cultural logic? Or, indeed, that the members of out-law communities are prepared to be brought into the arena of public surveillance in the service of reconstituting logics of litigation? It seems highly unlikely that all divergent cultural groups have developed equally, or that all members of these groups share Sloop and Ono's "imperial impulse" (51) to promote their conceptions and practices of justice. (2) Academic critical discourse is not transparent. Here I allude to the overall problem of translation (see Foucault 1994; Lyotard 1988; Lyotard and Thebaud 1985; Zabus 1995) as an extension of the previous concern. Critical discourse cannot become the medium of commensurability for divergent language games. Are we to believe that the "use" of out-law dis- course by critics to disrupt dominant practices can fail to do violence to these diverse/divergent logics? Are out-law discourses merely tools to be exploited and discarded in the pursuit of returning leftist academic dis- course to the center? (3) Perhaps the academic translation of out-law discourse could be true to the internal logic of the out-law community. And, perhaps the re-presentation of out-law logic within the academic community will bestow a degree of legitimacy on the out-law community. Nonetheless, the effect of legitimizing out-law discourse is unknown and potentially destructive. In an effort to siphon the political energy of out-law discourse into academic practice, we may ultimately destroy the dissatisfaction that serves as a cathexis for these out-law discourses. It seems possible that academic recognition might take the place of struggle for material opportunities (see Fraser 1997). But, will academic legitimation create any material changes in the conditions of out-law communities? I mean to suggest, not that it is better to allow the out-law community to suffer for its cause, but rather that incorporating the struggle into an (admittedly) impotent academic critique does not offer a prima facie alternative. (4) Criticism of resistance denies the practical and theoretical importance of opportunity. Returning to De Certeau's notion of tactics, the crucial element of these discursive moves is their use of opportunity to disrupt the proper authority of the dominant. The kairos of intervention provides the key to undermining "in-law" discourses. But when is the "right moment in time" for the academic reproduction of out-law discourse? Mapping the points of resistance (ala Foucault and Biesecker) entails interrogating "in-law" discourses for their incongruities and contradictions, not turning the academic gaze upon those communities waiting for an opportunity. Out-laws do not lurk in the forefront (66), hoping to be exposed by academic critics; they wait for the right moment for their disruption. Rhetoricians can provide rhetorical instructions for seeking opportunities and for exploiting these opportunities (literally making the culturally weaker argument the stronger), but this does not justify interrogating (intervening in) the cultural logics of the marginalized. The concerns raised here are not designed to dismiss Sloop and Ono's provocative essay. The divergent critical logic they outline deserves careful consideration within the critical community, and it is my hope that the concerns I raise may help to further problematize the relationship between resistance and rhetorical criticism. Rhetorical criticism As I have suggested, my purpose is to use the provocative nature of Sloop and Ono's project to extend disputes regarding the ends of rhetorical criticism. Diverging perspectives on the ends of criticism have been categorized by Barbara Warnick (1992) as falling along four general lines: artist, analyst, audience, and advocate. Leah Ceccarelli (1997) discerns similar categories around the aesthetic, epistemic, and political ends of rhetorical criticism. The out-law discourse project presents clear ties to the notion of critic as advocate. For Sloop and Ono, the critic is an interested party, discerning (and at times disputing) the underlying values and forces contained within a discourse. Additionally, however, the out-law discourse critic is an analyst focusing on the hidden, aberrant texts of the out-law and "rendering] an incoherent or esoteric text comprehensible" (Warnick 1992, 233). Now, I am not suggesting that a critic must serve only one function or that the roles of advocate and analyst are mutually exclusive; rather, these entanglings of power (political ends) and knowledge (epistemic ends) are inevitable. My concern is that we not neglect the complexity of these entanglements. Turning covert out-law discourses into objects of our analyses runs the risk of subjecting them both to the gaze of the dominant and to the power relations of the academy. As the works of Michel Foucault (especially 1979, 1980) aptly illustrate, practices presented as extending such noble goals as emancipation and humanity may endow institutions of confinement and objectification. Any justification for studying out-law dis- course because doing so may extend our political usefulness in the pursuit of emancipatory goals must not obscure the already existing power relations authorizing such studies. Our attempts to extend our domains of knowledge and expertise (authority) must not be pursued unreflexively.

#### Their own author agrees – within the university, community archiving becomes assimilated into an exclusionary and objectified space of commoditized control. This is the VERY NEXT PARAGRAPH after their card.

Cachola 14 (Ellen-Rae Cachola, PhD in Archival Studies from UCLA, “Archives of Transformation: A Case Study of the International Women’s Network Against Militarism’s Archival System,” [https://escholarship.org/content/qt4z62v6j5/qt4z62v6j5.pdf**//af)**](https://escholarship.org/content/qt4z62v6j5/qt4z62v6j5.pdf//))

However, academia and access to the academic archive, continues to be a contested space in the work for social justice. In the U.S., the university functions as an institution within the nation-state underpinned by the law of capitalism. Archives, as spaces of institutional memory and repositories of data, are governed by commoditized space and access. First, in order to access American higher education, tuition is necessary. Although some universities, like the University of California Los Angeles, give scholarships for low-income and minority students, the increasing cost of tuition makes it difficult for students from low-income or marginalized backgrounds who are not scholarship recipients to access the university. The university is a scarce space that is limited in the number of people it can allow into its auspices. Access to economic resources is among those defining features. This logic of scarcity to academic access is reflective of the scarcity of archival space. Similar to the fact that not everyone can access higher education, not everything can be admitted into archives—academia and archives are expensive real estate. There is a need to purchase or rent buildings or rooms that are climate controlled 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. Non-rusting shelves, acid free boxes and folders, computers, servers, office supplies and staff labor all need to be paid for. The scarcity of space lends to the development of memory-keeping infrastructure to protect that space, and maintain its exclusivity from the outside, in order to designate the value of what is within it. The records within the archival repository become subjected to objectification and commoditization as their identities must be inventoried, and access controlled, in order to protect the value of the collections importance for the future, which drives what is worthy of investment for the archive’s funders and managers. Therefore, although particular Ethnic Studies collections may be created, practices of inclusion and exclusion will still occur, and ways of preserving them will have to conform to the parameters of institutional infrastructure. The establishment of Ethnic Studies within particular U.S. universities was a product of social movement activity that sought to access, and transform the function of the university, which, at the time, was seen as a Eurocentric and classed enterprise. For example, in San Francisco and Los Angeles, community movements of the 1970s were crossing racial, class, gender and national boundaries in order to understand the systemic nature of structures of imperialism that were causing wars in Vietnam and implicating American people and institutions in the process.192 In addition, communities were organizing services for their own communities because their governments were not providing them. The vision for Ethnic Studies was to extend the values of community organizing into scholarship, toward dismantling systems of institutionalized oppression. Accessing the university would be a way for some activists to gain meritocratic power to develop policies and institutional spaces to provide infrastructure and educational resources for their communities. However, social movement access to the university meant the clarification of purpose to fit within the commoditized function of an institution bound to market forces. This occurred through establishing essentialized identitarian boundaries to focus the purpose of social movement research. African American Studies, Asian American Studies, Arab American Studies, Latino/a Studies, American Indian Studies, Postcolonial Studies,193 Women Studies, Lesbian Gay Bi Sexual and Transgender (LGBT) Studies were fields of study created194 to identify where specific “minority” issues could be studied. Although these institutional structures may reflect the racialization, gendering and siloization of identity, histories, cultures and memories, Feminist Scholar Sandra Harding argues that these identity based formations have been crucial for students who identify with those groupings to link themselves and their scholarship to the community collective from which they identify.195 In addition, the emergence of these specific disciplinary spaces have been linked through cross-listed courses and intellectually networked departments that encourage students to examine an issue from interdisciplinary perspectives.

#### Government action works – defeatist attitudes ensure that the world stays the same.

Glaude 16 [Eddie S. Professor of African American Studies and Religion at Princeton and a PhD in Religion from Princeton, 16 Democracy in Black: How Race Still Enslaves, p. 185-197]

But Goldwater failed to realize that governmental indifference can harden hearts, and government action can create conditions that soften them. People's attitudes aren't static or untouchable. They are molded by the quality of interactions with others, and one of the great powers of government involves shaping those interactions-not determining them in any concrete sense, but defining the parameters within which people come to know each other and live together. Today, for example, most Americans don't believe women should be confined to the home raising children, or subjected to crude advances and sexist remarks by men. The women's-rights movement put pressure on the government, which in turn passed laws that helped change some of our beliefs about women. Similarly, the relative progress of the 1960s did not happen merely by using the blunt instruments of the law. Change emerged from the ways those laws, with grassroots pressure, created new patterns of interactions, and ultimately new habits. Neither Obama's election to the presidency nor my appointment as a Princeton professor would have happened were it not for these new patterns and habits. None of this happens overnight. It takes time and increasing vigilance to protect and secure change. I was talking with a dose friend and he mentioned a basic fact: that we were only fifteen years removed from the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 when Ronald Reagan was elected president and Republicans began to dismantle the gains of the black freedom struggle. Civil rights legislation and the policies of the Great Society had just started to reshape our interactions when they started to be rolled back. We barely had a chance to imagine America anew-to pursue what full employment might look like, to let the abolition of the death penalty settle in, to question seriously the morality of putting people in prison cells, and to enact policies that would undo what the 1968 Kerner Commission described as "two Americas"­ before the attack on "big government" or, more precisely, the attack on racial equality was launched. The objective was to shrink the size of government ("to starve the beast") and to limit its domestic responsibilities to ensuring economic efficiency and national defense. Democrats eventually buckled, and this is the view of government, no matter who is in office, that we have today. It has become a kind of touchstone of faith among most Americans that government is wasteful and should be limited in its role-that it shouldn't intrude on our lives. Politicians aren't the only ones who hold this view. Many Americans do, too. Now we can't even imagine serious talk of things like full employment or the abolition of prisons. We have to change our view of government, especially when it comes to racial matters. Government policy ensured the vote for African Americans and dismantled legal segregation. Policy established a social safety net for the poor and elderly; it put in place the conditions for the growth of our cities. All of this didn't happen simply because of individual will or thanks to some abstract idea of America. It was tied up with our demands and expectations. Goldwater was wrong. So was Reagan. And, in many ways, so is Obama. Our racial habits are shaped by the kind of society in which we live, and our government plays a big role in shaping that society. As young children, our community offers us a way of seeing the world; it lets us know what is valuable and sacred, and what stands as virtuous behavior and what does not. When Michael Brown's body was left in the street for more than four hours, it sent a dear message about the value of black lives. When everything in our society says that we should be less concerned about black folk, that they are dangerous, that no specific policies can address their misery, we say to our children and to everyone else that these people are "less than"-that they fall outside of our moral concern. We say, without using the word, that they are niggers. One way to change that view is to enact policies that suggest otherwise. Or, to put it another way, to change our view of government, we must change our demands of government. For example, for the past fifty years African American unemployment has been twice that of white unemployment. The 2013 unemployment rate for African Americans stood at 13.1 percent, the highest annual black unemployment rate in more than seventy years. Social scientists do not generally agree on the causes of this trend. Some attribute it to the fact that African Americans are typically the "last hired and first fired." Others point to changes in the nature of the economy; still others point to overt racial discrimination in the labor market. No matter how we account for the numbers, the fact remains that most Americans see double-digit black unemployment as "normal." However, a large-scale, comprehensive jobs agenda with a living wage designed to put Americans, and explicitly African Americans, to work would go a long way toward uprooting the racial habits that inform such a view. It would counter the nonsense that currently stands as a reason for long-term black unemployment in public debate: black folk are lazy and don't want to work. If we hold the view that government plays a crucial role in ensuring the public good-if we believe that all Americans, no matter their race or class, can be vital contributors to our beloved community-then we reject the idea that some populations are disposable, that some people can languish in the shadows while the rest of us dance in the light. The question ''Am I my brother's or my sister's keeper?" is not just a question for the individual or a mantra to motivate the private sector. It is a question answered in the social arrangements that aim to secure the goods and values we most cherish as a community. In other words, we need an idea of government that reflects the value of all Americans, not just white Americans or a few people with a lot of money. We need government seriously committed to racial justice. As a nation, we can never pat ourselves on the back about racial matters. We have too much blood on our hands. Remembering that fact-our inheritance, as Wendell Berry said-does not amount to beating ourselves over the head, or wallowing in guilt, or trading in race cards. Remembering our national sins serves as a check and balance against national hubris. We're reminded of what we are capable of, and our eyes are trained to see that ugliness when it rears its head. But when we disremember-when we forget about the horrors of lynching, lose sight of how African Americans were locked into a dual labor market because of explicit racism, or ignore how we exported our racism around the world-we free ourselves from any sense of accountability. Concern for others and a sense of responsibility for the whole no longer matter. Cruelty and indifference become our calling cards. We have to isolate those areas in which long-standing trends of racial inequality short-circuit the life chances of African Americans. In addition to a jobs agenda, we need a comprehensive government response to the problems of public education and mass incarceration. And I do mean a government response. Private interests have overrun both areas, as privatization drives school reform (and the education of our children is lost in the boisterous battles between teachers' unions and private interests) and as big business makes enormous profits from the warehousing of black and brown people in prisons. Let's be clear: private interests or market-based strategies will not solve the problems we face as a country or bring about the kind of society we need. We have to push for massive government investment in early childhood education and in shifting the center of gravity of our society from punishment to restorative justice. We can begin to enact the latter reform by putting an end to the practice of jailing children. Full stop. We didn't jail children in the past. We don't need to now. In sum, government can help us go a long way toward uprooting racial habits with policies that support jobs with a living wage, which would help wipe out the historic double-digit gap between white and black unemployment; take an expansive approach to early childhood education, which social science research consistently says profoundly affects the life chances of black children; and dismantle the prison-industrial complex. We can no longer believe that disproportionately locking up black men and women constitutes an answer to social ills. This view of government cannot be dismissed as a naive pipe dream, because political considerations relentlessly attack our political imaginations and limit us to the status quo. We are told before we even open our mouths that this particular view won't work or that it will never see the light of day. We've heard enough of that around single payer health care reform and other progressive policies over the Obama years. Such defeatist attitudes conspire to limit our imaginations and make sure that the world stays as it is. But those of us who don't give a damn about the rules of the current political game must courageously organize, advocate, and insist on the moral and political significance of a more robust role for government. We have to change the terms of political debate. Something dramatic has to happen. American democracy has to be remade. John Dewey, the American philosopher, understood this: The very idea of democracy, the meaning of democracy, must be continually explored afresh; it has to be constantly discovered and rediscovered, remade and reorganized; while the political and economic and social institutions in which it is embodied have to be remade and reorganized to meet the changes that are going on in the development of new needs on the part of human beings and new resources for satisfying these needs. Dewey saw American democracy as an unfinished project. He knew that the aims and purposes of this country were not fixed forever in the founding documents, but the particular challenges of our moment required imaginative leaps on behalf of democracy itself. Otherwise, undemocratic forces might prevail; tyranny in the form of the almighty dollar and the relentless pursuit of it might overtake any commitment to the idea of the public good; and bad habits might diminish our moral imaginations. The remaking of America will not happen inside the Beltway. Too many there have too much invested in the status quo. A more robust idea of government will not emerge from the current political parties. Both are beholden to big money. Substantive change will have to come from us. Or, as the great civil rights leader Ella Baker said, "we are the leaders we've been looking for"-a model of leadership that scares the hell out of the Reverena Sharpton. We will have to challenge the status quo in the streets and at the ballot box. In short, it will take a full-blown democratic awakening to enact this revolution.

### 1NC – Progress Happens

#### Anti-black racism is a contested political process – historical progress is real despite losses and rollbacks. State engagement is necessary.

Omi & Winant 13 [Michael, Assoc Prof in the Ethnic Studies Department at UC Berkeley, Howard, Prof of Sociology at UC Santa Barbara, “Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36.6, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2012.715177]

We think that race is so profoundly a lived-in and lived-out part of both social structure and identity that it exceeds and transcends racism - thereby allowing for resistance to racism. Race, therefore, is more than ‘racism’; it is a fully fledged ‘social fact’ like sex/gender or class. From this perspective, race shapes racism as much as racism shapes race. Racial identities (individual and group), and other race-oriented concepts as well, are unstable. They are not uniforms; races are not teams; they are not defined solely by antagonism to one another. They vary internally and ideologically; they overlap and mix; their positions in the social structure shift; in other words they are shaped by political conflict. In Feagin and Elias’s account, white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the ‘white racial frame’ evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and reforms as merely ‘a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities that continue to define US society’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call ‘surface flexibility’ to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase ‘racial democracy’ is an oxymoron a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or political power in the USA, we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. Over the past decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional sites - employment, health, education - persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened tremendously. It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights movement, and that we ‘overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge racial inequalities’ (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about ‘racial reaction’ in a chapter of that name, and elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right wing was able to ‘rearticulate’ race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the 1960s have proved irreversible; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion. These racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that declared antimiscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his ‘interest convergence hypothesis’ effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnson’s famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 ‘We have lost the South for a generation’ count as ‘convergence’? The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways. As Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime under movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms which he calls ‘passive revolutions’ cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes, we think there were important if partial victories that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society. Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially defined ‘others’ and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself. They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other ‘new social movements’: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among others. By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same ‘rearticulation’ (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of ‘colourblindness’ and its variants; indeed all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various ‘backlash’ phenomena of the past few decades, even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of ‘colourblindness’, reveal the transformative character of the ‘politicization of the social’. While it is not possible here to explore so extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. Feagin and Elias’s use of racial categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to ‘racial lumping’ and essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the term ‘whites’ at times refers to all whites, white elites, ‘dominant white actors’ and very exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms ‘black’, ‘African American’ and ‘Latino’ appear, the term ‘people of colour’ is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically. Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more ‘coloured’. A ‘majority-minority’ national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the state’s population. While the decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Elias’s essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the ‘systemic racism’ approach is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socioeconomic parity with whites, while others are subject to what we might call ‘engineered poverty’ in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined groups (‘black/ brown’ conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the ‘new white ethnics’, able to ‘work toward whiteness’ 4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale, all drive migration. The country’s economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the ‘whitening’ of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words this argument’s key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants ‘of a different color’ (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Elias’s systemic racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Elias’s account. In their view racially identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant ‘white racial frame’, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and influence each others’ boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups as well as those ambiguously identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely. We still want to acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Elias’s critique of the reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The ‘new Jim Crow’ (Alexander 2012) or even the ‘new slavery’ that the present system practises is something that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on this topic, notably about the nature of the ‘prison-industrial complex’ (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But beyond Feagin and Elias’s denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-and-order appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the ‘Southern strategy’. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and injustices that the ‘new Jim Crow’ represents, incarceration, profiling and similar practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile. Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an ‘oreo’, a shill for Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white people’s party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white man’s token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers’ rights particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obama’s centrism and unwillingness to raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community and other communities of colour as well remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a ‘black bourgeoisie’ in Frazier’s (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the ‘working towards whiteness’ framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system chiefly profiling by the police (‘stop and frisk’) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth. Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obama’s credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlanta’s Lakewood section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obama’s election of no importance? In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so ‘sutured’ (as Laclau and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that ‘resistance is futile?’ This seems to be the underlying political logic of the ‘systemic racism’ approach, perhaps unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the always- absurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that racial conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless, and that whites are not so omnipotent, as Feagin and Elias’s analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity might be. While racism largely white continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes, there have been enormous increases in racial inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic, abides. Resistance is not futile.

### 1NC – Crackdown

#### The aff’s tactics get put down HARD by the government

Culper 19 [Samuel, former soldier, Intelligence NCO, “Thoughts on “CIVIL WAR 2 in America – WHO WOULD WIN?” Video,” *Forward Observer*, 6/18/19, https://forwardobserver.com/thoughts-on-civil-war-2-in-america-who-would-win-video/]

I’m reminded of the Clausewitz quote, “Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult.” In other words, thinking through and executing a war is easier said than done. The killing people part can be commonly understood, but winning a war is actually very complex. That tends to glossed over when talking about conflict, especially “Civil War 2,” which is why this topic has become a pet peeve of mine. What really piqued my interest about this particular is that it’s supposedly an “in-depth analysis,” a point on which I disagree. I found it to be very superficial. And I don’t mean to be rude or condescending, I just think for as complete as its being sold, it lacks a lot of important factors, which I’ll detail below. And that’s not to make light of the serious points discussed, but I’ll point out some glaring flaws of the thinking here, along with time stamps. (John Mark, if you read this or if someone can get us in touch, there are a lot of things to consider when thinking through a conflict scenario. You’ve considered a lot of factors. I believe you’re missing some critical ones. I do this for a living, and I’d be happy to talk with you about your video and matrix.) First, let me start off by saying I agree with a few things. 1. Many Americans on both sides are angry at each other. 2. Demographically speaking, the Left is going to be able to achieve one-party rule within the next 10 years. (The next time they get power, they can push through amnesty and create a permanent majority. My thoughts on this point are covered here, from April 2018.) 3. Trump very well could be the last Republican president, which I’ve pointed out numerous times on this Dispatch blog. Now let’s get into what wrong, which is a lot… ~4:00: John Mark begins reading off this alleged “red team” (RT) planner’s analysis. RT makes the statement: “The moment civil war is declared, the government loses,” which is patently false. Let’s consider that the government is full of bureaucrats, many (possibly most) of whom are Left Wing apparatchiks, as evidenced by how President Trump finds it so difficult to get mid-level apparatchiks to implement the policies with which they disagree. Unlike you, they will keep their jobs during this war. I would push back on the idea that the federal government is completely helpless because government controls financial institutions: bank accounts, 401ks, IRAs, other retirement accounts and pensions, etc. An enormous amount of power and influence can be brought to bear against those involved in a legitimate civil war. (Side note: If you expect to fight in this civil war, you might want to cash out before it happens.) Under a Democratic president, that power and influence would absolutely target the ‘domestic terrorists’. We’re talking about easy territory for Emergency Powers, in which the finances of those involved would be immediately frozen and probably confiscated. That means in addition to being on the run from at least federal law enforcement (if not parts of the military), you have no job, you have no income, you have no access to your finances, you will lose your house, your family’s well-being will be put in jeopardy, and that’s going to keep a lot of people out of this supposed fight. We’re not talking about millions of Americans walking away from their jobs, or taking time off work, to go fight in some fantasy civil war. And it’s incredibly short-sighted to think that any force opposing the federal government would win in the snap of some fingers, as RT alleges. We’re not looking at a high intensity, conventional war. It’s not going to happen. What’s far more likely is that states or regions disassociate themselves from federal authority and decouple from the Union, if a war were to occur. But, again, I’d point out that so many Americans are so dependent on a functioning national economy and our financial system that there’s too much at risk for most people to get involved at any level. This is going to bring financial hardships that most have not considered. You have to understand that a conventional war like the one John Mark and RT are talking about would be the end of trillions of dollars of financial interests. Win, lose, or draw, it means losing everything because a left wing government is not going to allow ‘domestic terrorists’ to have comfortable lives. They will immediately seek ways to raise the cost of your involvement, and they need the money, anyway. Stealing your bank accounts and retirement savings is a no-brainer. 6:20: “[Disrupting public utilities like electricity] would also turn the people against the government more quickly and paralyze the government’s propaganda machine.” I’ve been to Iraq and Afghanistan where utilities were disrupted by insurgents. The people didn’t blame the government for the attacks. They mostly blamed the Americans, followed by the insurgents. Even if attacks to take down the grid were successful, we’re again talking about the immediate loss of trillions of dollars in financial interests. You are not going to be heralded as the saviors of the country. You are going to be seen as domestic terrorists, and you’re going to piss off a lot of people — including law enforcement, military, and others who may have nominally been on your side, but who’s lives will be vastly more difficult because they no longer have their livelihoods, retirements, pensions, or benefits. And now their families are put at risk because you took away the last part of convenient life they had. I also need to point out that John Mark gives a “big advantage” to the right wing in their ability to take out the power grid. Furthermore, John Mark says of this: “The Left establishment and the military have no equivalent ability to create such a big bang for buck type activity [sic] or leverage over the grassroots right wing revolutionaries.” Wrong. You know what’s easier than taking out the power grid? The government selectively turning off parts of the grid under its emergency powers. The power goes down in areas where the uprisings are the worst and the government lets the people know that the power comes back on as soon as the uprising is quelled. This happens around the world all the time. It’s a standard procedure, along with cell services. That’s a lot of people who want a return to normalcy and who are now turned against the insurgents. That’s a lot of people turning on the insurgents so they can get their lives restored. 8:00: RT then goes on to describe that government studies show that 30 percent of the American public would join a revolution against the government. I can’t confirm or deny that, and neither can RT without some evidence. (Does John Mark even mention where he found RTs post?) We’d have to break down this 30 percent along the lines of what we know to be true about modern civil wars: only a small fraction does any of the fighting. Maybe one percent on average, certainly no more than five percent. The rest would provide what’s called “combat support” or “combat service support.” Transportation, logistics, sabotage, propaganda, etc. — the other two sides of the three-part insurgency (guerrilla fighters, the underground, the auxiliary). Read this for additional information. RT claims that, historically, you only need 10 percent of a population to participate in an armed rebellion in order to win. One of the most preeminent thinkers and strategists on guerrilla warfare, USMC Brigadier General Samuel Griffith and his studies show that popular support from 15-25 percent of the population is the bottom of what’s required for a successful insurgency. I don’t know where RT got his information, but I’m willing to share my citations if he’ll share his. John Mark claims that 10-15 million Americans consider themselves Alt-Right, which was probably based on the famous 2016 poll, back when Alt-Right still meant merely ‘fed up with the GOP establishment,’ instead of the association with white nationalism that it carries today. Maybe there are legitimately 10-15 million white nationalists in America, but they’re geographically dispersed and have negligible political power. And the establishment is dead set on limiting their influence. Even if that number were 15 million, the Alt-Right represents less than five percent of the American populace — which is far short of what’s required for a successful insurgency. In other words, a “white nationalist civil war” is not going to happen. A “conservative civil war” is only slightly more likely, as I’ll explain below. When viewed in proper context, the point John Mark is actually making favors secession or a regional conflict with a higher likelihood of success… which is a far more likely possibility than a conventional, nationwide, coast to coast civil war, which is just bonkers to consider. 11:45: RT points out that the U.S. is among the world’s largest arms manufacturers. In the event of a civil war, the federal government would immediately move to shut down and confiscate production. In the lead up, there would likely be laws and additional regulations, which would ironically accelerate the conflict. Either way, these factories won’t be churning out arms during the conflict. On the topic of 4GW and Afghanistan, the thinking here is incredibly, incredibly short-sighted and people who say these things have no clue what they’re talking about. YES, the Taliban has run circles around U.S. Forces in Afghanistan but let’s keep in mind a few things… – The kill ratio for U.S. soldiers is something like 30:1. That is, 30 Taliban killed for every one U.S. soldier. U.S. Forces win a large majority of tactical engagements. By a landslide, it’s not even close. Tactically, no one is better than the U.S. military. Afghanistan was a strategic loss due to politics, the doctrinal failures of nation building, and our “security partners” in the Afghan military and government, 90% of whom were too incompetent and/or too corrupt to win. – U.S. Forces were greatly limited by resources and manpower in Afghanistan. Nearly everything soldiers used or consumed was flown or driven in from out of country. That won’t be the case in the United States. – This is probably the greatest differing factor: Had Afghanistan ubiquitously adopted social media like Americans, that war would have been over in weeks. If I, as a targeting intelligence analyst, had access to years worth of Facebook photos and check-ins, Twitter posts, YouTube videos, Instagram photos, and other information, we could have mapped out insurgent cells in hours. (In fact, there’s software that can automatically do that for you.) Access to that kind of data is a targeteer’s dream. You throw in Google data, cell phone geolocation, Ancestry DNA, and people who know you and also hate you, and we’re talking about an incredible amount of targeting intelligence — not to mention some of it would be real-time. Yes, there are frustrations with that volume of information and those kinds of data, but most people who engage in the “civil war” talk don’t understand how radically their lives would have to change in order to avoid being killed or captured. John Mark and whoever else can talk about 4GW as much as they want, but if that’s as much as you understand about warfighting and how wars are executed in real life, you don’t know enough.

# 2NC

### 2NC - Definitions

#### Anti-competitive business practices are those practices that do harm to businesses or consumers – the affirmative had to add something to the list

Gibbs Law Group No Date (Anticompetitive Practices. https://www.classlawgroup.com/antitrust/unlawful-practices/)

Federal and state antitrust laws prohibit anticompetitive behavior and unfair business practices that harm other businesses and consumers.

Examples of these unlawful, anticompetitive practices include:

Price Fixing – an agreement among competitors to raise, fix, or otherwise maintain the price at which their goods or services are sold.

Pay-for-Delay – an agreement between a brand drug manufacturer and a would-be generic competitor to delay the release of a generic version of the branded drug, depriving consumers of lower-priced generics.

Bid-Rigging – competitors agree in advance who will submit the winning bid during a competitive bidding process. As with price fixing, it is not necessary that all bidders participate in the conspiracy.

Monopolization – one or more persons or companies totally dominates an economic market.

Unfair Competition – an attempt to gain unfair competitive advantage through false, fraudulent, or unethical commercial conduct.

Market Division – an agreement between competitors not to compete within each other’s geographic territories.

Group Boycotts – two or more competitors agree not to do business with a specific person or company.

Exclusive Dealing Arrangements – an agreement that a buyer will only buy exclusively from the supplier.

Price Discrimination – charging different prices to similarly situated buyers. Certain types of price discrimination may be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act.

Tying – when a company makes the purchase of an item conditioned on buying a second item.

#### Grammar outweighs --- it determines meaning, making it a pre-requisite to predictable ground and limits – and, without it, debate is impossible

Allen 93 (Robert, Editor and Director – The Chambers Dictionary, Does Grammar Matter?)

Grammar matters, then, because it is the accepted way of using language, whatever one’s exact interpretation of the term. Incorrect grammar hampers communication, which is the whole purpose of language. The grammar of standard English matters because it is a codification of the way using English that most people will find acceptable.

#### defining the term US is a prereq to debate bc assemblage allows for literally any resident to be included- explodes limits

FGF 9

(Family Guardian Fellowship, “AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING OF THE TERM "UNITED STATES"”

<http://famguardian.org/subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/Definitions/freemaninvestigation.htm>)

I doubt if many Americans have ever given a second thought to the meaning of the term United States, or would believe that it could be a perplexing question. It would have my vote, however, as being by far the most important and controversial word (or term) of art, vocabula artis also referred to as a statute term, leading word (or term), or what the French call parol de ley, technical word of law in all American legal writings as well as the most dangerous. For it is ambivalent, equivocal, and ambiguous. Indeed, as you will see, its use in the law exemplifies patent ambiguity, which is defined as: An ambiguity apparent on face of instrument [sic] and arising by reason of any inconsistency or inherent uncertainty of language used so that effect is either to convey no definite meaning or confused meaning. (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Emphasis added.) Reading Hamlet in the park this afternoon, I chanced on to an intriguing way to put it. In the words of King Claudius: The harlot's cheek, beautified with plast ring art, Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it Than is my deed to my most painted word. O heavy burden! (III, I, 51-54. Emphasis added.) The editor, Harold Jenkins, in his notes on painted says: " fair but false in appearance, like the beauty of the painted cheek." What serendipity to find this, just as I am on my final proofing of this paper. It is so appropriate, to describe how 'United States' usually is used by the government. And it has indeed imposed on us all a heavy burden ! With dogged determination and perseverance, however, one can succeed in seeing through this meticulous and painstakingly contrived duplicity. For, fortunately, Congress must define all terms that it uses in a particular and special way. For example, in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), chapter 79 Definitions, Section 7701 Definitions, it states: "(a) When used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof " It goes on, then, to define many terms of art. These definitions apply throughout the code, "where not otherwise distinctly expressed" which will sometimes be done for a single chapter, section, subsection, or even sentence which, you will later see, can be very instructive. I fear that such analysis can be tedious, and for this I apologize. I will try to be as pithy and compendious as possible, but I am not writing merely to express opinions; I am writing to prove the points I discuss. And I will worry a question like a bull dog, until I am satisfied that I have presented enough hard data to conclusively establish my particular contention, especially in the eyes of those of a different persuasion. For there are intelligent and respected researchers, for whom I have the greatest regard, who do not agree, for example, with my interpretation of the meaning of 'United States' in Title 26, as well as in all the other titles. The history of the usage of United States, from the time of the American colonies to the present, is remarkably complex. This is thoroughly investigated in an easy-reading yet scholarly book that I highly recommend, by Sebastian de Gracia, A Country With No Name, Pantheon, 1997. Herein, however, I will have occasion to avail myself of virtually nothing from this wonderful tome. When I think of this, it astonishes even me. But my focus is primarily on the relevance of this term as it relates to the law, especially tax law, to which he simply doesn t allude at least in the way I do. Before getting started, let me give you just a hint as to why it is so extremely important to have an absolutely correct interpretation of the term United States, but also, in the two quotes below, nonresident alien, and gross income. This preview is an important section from the IRC, which is Title 26, also written in cites as 26 United States Code or 26 USC, Section (the symbol or, often, as in this paper, these are omitted) 872 Gross income: (a) General rule. In the case of a nonresident alien individual gross income includes only (1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and (2) gross income which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States Add to this 26 USC §7701(b)(1)(B): An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident of the United States and I think you will agree that the cardinal conundrum here indeed the very crux is the determination as to what is meant by the term "United States" and, above, nonresident alien. For, under certain circumstances we see that the nonresident alien is not subject to any federal income tax if his relationship to the United States is of a certain nature. The United States is an abstraction given substantiality when delegated duties began to be performed, and when 1:8:17 of the Constitution was implemented, which provided for land for the seat of government, as well as forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings

### 2NC – TVA

#### Antitrust can be a powerful tool to combat structural racism – health care and franchising are two possible topical affirmatives

Kritter 21 [Dani, Legal intern at the ACLU of Louisiana Justice Lab, Assoc Editor of the California Law Review, “Antitrust as Antiracist,” *California Law Review Blog*, March, <https://www.californialawreview.org/antitrust-as-antiracist/>, accessed 09/12/21, JCR]

The federal antitrust laws—three statutes enacted over a century ago—are in the spotlight. The year 2020 brought a new reckoning with corporate power and a resurgent interest in using antitrust law as a force for populist change. The “hipster antitrust” movement argues that the focus of antitrust policy should not be limited to market power and consumer welfare. Rather, antitrust can and should be a remedy for a suite of societal ills, from workers’ rights to campaign finance and income inequality. The year 2020 also marked an awakening to racial injustice in America. The deaths of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and Ahmaud Arbery sparked nationwide outrage and demands to reform institutions built on systemic racism. Yet the recent plans for antitrust reform—which primarily focus on monopolies in tech—ignore the fact that the antitrust status quo perpetuates racial injustice. But it doesn’t have to be this way. This blog identifies consolidation in healthcare and vertical restraints in franchising as two examples of how lax antitrust enforcement has disproportionately harmed people of color. It also argues that by dusting off existing antitrust tools, antitrust enforcement can be antiracist. Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to check the power of massive corporations run amuck. These laws—the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act, and the Clayton Act—were originally designed to control corporate power, protect individual economic freedom, and ensure a fair and equal society. But beginning in the 1970s when Robert Bork published the still-influential “Antitrust Paradox,” courts slowly narrowed the focus of antitrust law to protecting consumer welfare. Today, antitrust enforcement prioritizes preventing the anticompetitive acquisition, exercise, or maintenance of market power that threatens consumer welfare and competition—a much narrower goal than its populist origins. Recent years have seen bipartisan interest in reining in powerful corporations with more aggressive antitrust enforcement. One of the few agency voices calling for an antiracist approach to antitrust is Rebecca Slaughter, the acting chair of the FTC. Slaughter has recently spoken out about using antitrust enforcement to “right the wrongs of systemic racism.” She challenges what she views to be a faulty premise of antitrust law: “that antitrust can and should be value-neutral, and therefore social justice problems like racism do not have a role in antitrust enforcement.” Slaughter argues that antitrust has never been and never will be value-neutral. Antitrust addresses market structures, and racism is entrenched in the historic and current market structures in the United States. When agencies make decisions about how to deploy antitrust tools, they can choose whether to reinforce these structural inequities or to dismantle them. Healthcare and franchising are two examples of how a shift in antitrust enforcement from “value-neutral” to antiracist can break down market structures that perpetuate racial injustice. Consolidation in the healthcare industry is a driving force behind the sky-high cost of medical care and pharmaceutical drugs. Due to a wave of healthcare mergers, most hospital markets in the United States are dominated by a single corporate entity. The lack of competition means the dominant hospital is free to exercise market power by raising prices and restricting output. Recent studies of prices for hospital and outpatient treatment report that healthcare mergers have resulted in large networks charging private insurers 2.5 to 3 times more than Medicare rates for the same patient care. These rising costs lead to higher insurance premiums paid by employers and individuals. Artificially inflated healthcare costs disproportionately burden people of color and create a barrier to accessing quality care. Black families spend a greater share of their household income on health care premiums and out-of-pocket costs than the average American family. And of the thirty million uninsured individuals in the United States, half are people of color. The COVID-19 pandemic has put this health inequity in sharp focus: racial and ethnic minority groups are more likely to contract the virus, get severely ill, and die from coronavirus infections. What can antitrust do? First, antitrust merger review can be antiracist. Mergers between competitors are scrutinized under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, which prohibits mergers that may substantially lessen competition or create a monopoly. When determining whether a merger lessens competition, the FTC, Department of Justice (DOJ), and courts consider the likelihood of anticompetitive effects. An antiracist application of the Clayton Act would consider racially disparate outcomes like health care costs, insurance premiums, and the quality of care provided as anticompetitive effects. Business practices that perpetuate systemic racism are anticompetitive because they exclude people of color from full participation in the market. And this exclusion is expensive: a study by Citigroup estimates that discrimination cost the U.S. economy $16 trillion since 2000. Moreover, there is precedent for applying a broad conception of anticompetitive effects in merger review. In Brown Shoe Co. Inc. v. United States, the Supreme Court held that a meager 7.2 percent combined market share of two merging shoe manufacturers was unhealthy market concentration under the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Earl Warren acknowledged that concentration in the shoe industry might offer some efficiencies and lower prices for consumers, but “the protection of viable, small, locally owned businesses” was a priority. Therefore, agencies can and should argue that mergers that reinforce racial inequity substantially lessen competition. Second, antitrust enforcement actions can hone in on industries like healthcare where the anticompetitive effects are acutely felt by people of color. As California attorney general from 2011 to 2017, Vice President Kamala Harris prioritized taking on healthcare prices through antitrust. Her investigation laid the groundwork for California’s suit against Sutter Health for using its market power to raise prices and extort better deals from insurers, which resulted in a $575 million settlement. The DOJ and FTC should follow in California and Vice President Harris’s footsteps and crack down on healthcare, utilizing an antiracist approach. Franchising—a business form where a firm owning a brand outsources the delivery of goods or services to a separate firm or individual in exchange for a royalty off of gross sales—is a dominant mode of industrial organization in the United States. Because buying into a franchise bypasses the necessity of acquiring capital and working industry connections to get a business off the ground, economists have long lauded franchising as a straightforward path to economic independence. Franchising has become an important source of income and opportunity for minorities and immigrants. And in occupations like the restaurant industry, franchised businesses employ a significant share of workers of color. Yet franchise contracts empower franchisors (the parent company) to hold franchisees (the individual business owners) and their employees in a vice-like grip. Under most franchise contracts, the parent company limits the franchisee’s ability to make decisions regarding prices, customers, and suppliers. Because the contract deprives franchisees of discretion over virtually every aspect of the business except for wages and hours, underpaying and overworking employees becomes the only way to maximize profits. Franchisors exacerbate this dynamic with “no-poach” clauses that prevent franchise operators from hiring employees of another operator within the same franchise business. No-poach clauses suppress wages because franchisees cannot compete for employees with better pay and working conditions. At the same time that franchisors make it nearly impossible for franchisees and employees to prosper, they force franchisees to bear the risk if the venture fails. By using contract terms to reduce what franchisees can earn outside the franchise relationship relative to within it, parent companies induce their franchisees to work even harder than the value of the franchise contract warrants. Most franchise contracts include noncompete agreements, forum selection clauses that highly favor the franchisor, and a right of first refusal to any sale of the franchisee’s business. And most require franchisors to sign personal guarantees, which gives the franchisor a right to claim the franchisee’s personal assets in the event of bankruptcy or litigation. Antitrust law labels these contractual limitations as “vertical restraints:” restrictions on competition agreed to by firms at different levels of the distribution process. Vertical restraints empower large corporations to control workers and reduce labor costs without taking on the traditional legal responsibilities for that control. And this control can be implemented on a discriminatory basis. In September 2020, fifty Black former franchisees sued McDonald’s for forcing them to operate in “economically depressed” communities and “dangerous locations” where profits were lower. A shift in antitrust law is largely to blame for the proliferation of vertical restraints. Vertical restraints were once considered per se illegal restraints of trade under the Sherman Act. But in a series of decisions beginning with Continental Television v. GTE Sylvania in 1977 and culminating in Leegin Creative Leather Products v. PSKS in 1997, the Supreme Court held that vertical restraints were presumptively lawful and thus subject to a more searching and defendant-friendly rule of reason analysis. Since that shift, antitrust enforcement has largely stayed away from challenging restrictive franchise contracts. An antiracist approach to antitrust would not shy away from challenging these exploitative business models. First, federal agencies could follow in the steps of states like Washington that investigated the use of restrictive no-poach clauses as per se illegal restraints of trade. The pressure created by Washington’s investigations led seven major fast-food chains to agree to end no-poach deals. An investigation by the FTC or DOJ into no-poach clauses and other anticompetitive vertical restraints common in franchising could have even more impact, given their national scope. Second, franchising demonstrates that antitrust reform should not narrowly focus on big tech monopolies. Instead, antitrust reform should include industries like franchising, where large corporations restrict the economic freedom of minority business owners and employees. Scrutinizing the use of vertical restraints in franchising is just as essential to preventing abuses of market power and would remedy a structural inequality that disproportionately harms people of color. Antitrust enforcement is not a replacement for more aggressive reforms, and by nature can only address one transaction or firm at a time. Moreover, it is limited to fines rather than sweeping conduct remedies. But antitrust enforcement can put a dent in the structural problems driving the health care affordability crisis and the extortion of franchisees. And in doing so, it can leverage the power of the federal government to be actively race-conscious and to take actions to end racial inequities. Backed by the push to reform antitrust, the demands to dismantle structural racism, and a new Democratic administration, an antiracist approach to antitrust could dust off the toolbox and begin to dismantle the “value-neutral” antitrust status quo.

#### Empirically proven antitrust can be used to counter racist practices – Vietnamese shrimpers in Texas

Newman 21 [John, Prof of Law at the Univ of Miami, “Racist Antitrust, Antiracist Antitrust,” Antitrust Bulletin, https://doi.org/10.1177/0003603X211031675, JCR]

After the U.S. military exited Vietnam in 1975, millions of Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian people fled the region. Rapid congressional action facilitated emigration to the United States for many of these displaced persons. Many settled in coastal Texas, a designated resettlement site that offered a familiar opportunity for sustenance: fishing and shrimping. Unsurprisingly, the refugees’ integration into the local economy was met with hostility on the part of incumbents. One antiimmigrant tactic was political: at the behest of the Texas Shrimp Association, the state legislature passed a bill in early 1981 that imposed a 2-year ban on issuing new shrimping licenses. But in towns and cities along the Gulf coast, nativist locals were unsatisfied with what they perceived to be a half-measure by the state legislature. Boat merchants began charging premium prices to Vietnamese immigrants. Bait shops refused to sell to them. Rumors flew, with some locals suggesting the new shrimpers were being subsidized by the U.S. Government. Incumbents suggested that the new entrants were overfishing and underpricing. A shaky cease-fire agreement was drawn up but quickly fell apart after the Federal Trade Commission warned that it violated the Sherman Act. In January 1981, one of the nativist locals met with Louis Beam, a Grand Dragon of the Knights of the KKK, to present the concerns of “a group of American fishermen.” The Klan moved swiftly. At a rally held on Valentine’s Day in Sante Fe, Beam warned the crowd that it “may become necessary to take laws into our own hands.” The Grand Dragon went on to invite attendees to train at Klan-organized “military camps,” inveighing that it would be necessary to “fight, fight, fight” and see “blood, blood, blood” for the salvation of the country. Beam vowed to give the newcomers “a lot better fight here than they got from the Viet Cong.” The crowd watched a demonstration of how to burn a boat and later a cross. On a clear day in March, a shrimp boat owned by one of the long-term residents was seen carrying men garbed in the traditional white robes and pointed hats of the KKK. Most were visibly armed, and the boat had been fitted with—and was firing—a cannon. Locals reported receiving threats that those who did business with Vietnamese immigrants would be viewed as “enemies.” A woman who had allowed an immigrant-owned fishing boat to use her dock was issued a warning: “You have been paid a ‘friendly visit’ do you want the next one to be a ‘real one.’” Klansmen burned crosses in the yards of immigrant shrimpers, set their fishing boats ablaze, and firebombed a home. Meanwhile, in Alabama, the cofounders of the Southern Poverty Law Center [SPLC] had been closely monitoring the Klan’s activities. In April 1981, Morris Dees and Joseph Levin filed a wide-ranging lawsuit in federal court, seeking to enjoin the Klan’s reign of terror. Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, the first African American judge in the state of Texas, was assigned to hear the case. The defendants called for her disqualification, referring to her supposed prejudice against the Klan. Beam publicly called her a racial slur. Throughout the entire proceedings, Judge McDonald and her family received death threats and one-way tickets to Africa. Among the fourteen counts pleaded were violations of Sherman Act $1 and $2. The $1 claim formed the core of the antitrust case: plaintiffs alleged that the defendants—the Knights of the KKK, Beam, various anonymous members of the Klan, the “American Fishermen’s Coalition,” and several individual fishermen—had conspired “to force the Vietnamese fishermen class to terminate or at the very least curtail their commercial fishing business in the Galveston Bay area” and to try to “intimidate them into selling off sixty percent of their shrimping boats.” The conspiracy’s goal, per the complaint, was to “eliminate or reduce competition” for incumbent fishermen in the area. After granting class certification, Judge McDonald issued a preliminary injunction ordering the defendants to cease their campaign of violence, threats, and intimidation. The imbalance of societal and material power was subtly—and effectively—emphasized throughout Judge McDonald’s opinion. Facts were presented without embellishment; they spoke for themselves. The reader learns, for example, of a Vietnamese shrimp seller who testified that “six weeks ago two American men drove up in a truck and pointed a gun at her” and that “her husband will not take out their shrimp boat on May 15, 1981 because she is afraid that he will be killed.” The antitrust analysis is notable for its clarity and brevity—indeed, to the contemporary observer, it is perhaps most remarkable for what it does not say. Although Judge McDonald began by stating that ”the antitrust laws” forbid a “lessening of competitive conditions in the relevant market,” she went on to explain that the plaintiffs could prove such a “lessening” by demonstrating an actual marketplace effect. No formal market definition was required. Nor did the opinion engage in a protracted attempt to fit the defendants’ conduct into a particular analytical category before deciding on the appropriate legal treatment. Again, proof of actual harmful effects was sufficient, at least to receive a preliminary injunction. In August, the court made the injunction permanent and ordered it to be posted publicly in the Gulf Coast area.

### 2NC - Ballot

#### The ballot is a poor vehicle for change---wins-as-solidary are an extrinsic incentive, which fails and corrodes more effective intrinsic motivations- means they don’t create more rev v rev debates because people aren’t motivated to have those discussions- turns the aff and means you vote on framework

Kohn 93 – Alfie Kohn, MA in Social Sciences from the University of Chicago, BA from Brown University, internally quoting Edward L. Deci, Professor of Psychology and Gowen Professor in the Social Sciences at the University of Rochester, No Contest: The Case Against Competition, p. 59-60

The idea that trying to do well and trying to do better than others may work at cross-purposes can be understood in the context of an issue addressed by motivational theorists. We do best at the tasks we enjoy. An outside or extrinsic motivator (money, grades, the trappings of competitive success) simply cannot take the place of an activity we find rewarding in itself. "While extrinsic motivation may affect performance," wrote Margaret Clifford, "performance is dependent upon learning, which in turn is primarily dependent upon intrinsic motivation." More specifically, "a significant performance-increase on a highly complex task will be dependent upon intrinsic motivation."59 In fact, even people who are judged to be high in achievement motivation do not perform well unless extrinsic motivation has been minimized, as several studies have shown.60

Competition works just as any other extrinsic motivator does. As Edward Deci, one of the leading students of this topic, has written, "The reward for extrinsically motivated behavior is something that is separate from and follows the behavior. With competitive activities, the reward is typically 'winning' (that is, beating the other person or the other team), so the reward is actually extrinsic to the activity itself."51 This has been corroborated by subjective reports: people who are more competitive regard themselves as being extrinsically motivated.62 Like any other extrinsic motivator, competition cannot produce the kind of results that flow from enjoying the activity itself.

But this tells only half the story. As research by Deci and others has shown, the use of extrinsic motivators actually tends to undermine intrinsic motivation and thus adversely affect performance in the long run. The introduction of, say, monetary reward will edge out intrinsic satisfaction; once this reward is withdrawn, the activity may well cease even though no reward at all was necessary for its performance earlier. Money "may work to 'buy off one's intrinsic motivation for an activity. And this decreased motivation appears (from the results of the field experiment) to be more than just a temporary phenomenon."63 Extrinsic motivators, in other words, are not only ineffective but corrosive. They eat away at the kind of motivation that *does* produce results.

This effect has been shown specifically with competition. In a 1981 study, eighty undergraduates worked on a spatial relations puzzle. Some of them were asked to try to solve it more quickly than the penons sitting next to them, while others did not have to compete. The subjects then sat alone (but clandestinely observed) for a few minutes in a room that contained a similar puzzle. The time they voluntarily spent working on it, together with a self-report on how interested they had been in solving the puzzle, constituted the measure of intrinsic interest. As predicted, the students who had been competing were less intrinsically motivated than those who had originally worked on the puzzle in a noncompetitive environment. It was concluded that

trying to beat another party is extrinsic in nature and tends to decrease people's intrinsic motivation for the target activity. It appears that when people are instructed to compete at an activity, they begin to see that activity as an instrument for winning rather than an activity which is mastery-oriented and rewarding in its own right. Thus, competition seems to work like many other extrinsic rewards in that, under certain circumstances, it tends to be perceived as controlling and tends to decrease intrinsic motivation.114

### 2NC - Crackdown

#### Boundary struggle doesn’t create successful new logistics- it would invite unfathomable scales of crackdowns.

Flaherty 5 USC BA in International Relations, researcher in political affairs, activist and organic farmer in New Zealand, <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html>

[ACS = American Corporate State]

THE NATURE OF ARMED INSURGENCY AGAINST THE ACS Any violent insurgency against the ACS is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the ACS has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The ACS attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain.4 This makes the ACS impervious to traditional insurgency tactics. - Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus The ACS employs a full time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginable to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have no idea of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS. The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS. Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement. Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces. Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control. Letters-to-the-editor... Calls-to-elected-representatives... Waving banners... “Third” party political activities... Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones... Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations. It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways. If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins. But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

#### Militancy fails and greases the wheels for state crackdown – the historical record proves that is doesn’t spill over to legal change.

Rhee 18 – Professor, West Virginia University College of Law (William, Using the Master ’s Tool to Dismantle His House: Derrick Bell, Herbert Wechsler, and Critical Legal Process , Volume 3 Number 1 Concordia Law Review Article 2, 2018)

Critical Legal Process echoes Erika Wechsler and the Last Black Hero’s desire for concrete action. Concrete action, of course, is not necessary.471 The common complaint lodged against critical legal movements as nihilistic is unfounded.472 Before you can resolve a problem, you have to know that the problem exists. Identifying a problem without offering any concrete solutions remains a genuine scholarly contribution. However, Bell appears to disagree. He prefaces his Erika Wechsler story with a quote from the Book of James in the Bible: “For as the body without the spirit is dead, so faith without works is dead also.”473 Mere faith in critical theory thus would appear to be insufficient to Bell. One must live that faith through concrete action. If, however, we take critical legal movements’ pessimistic assumptions about the Master’s oppression474 seriously, then ironically, the only viable alternative for concrete action is the rule of law. Critical Legal Process thus literally or figuratively focuses on using the Master’s favorite tool to dismantle his house. Because they agree with Lorde that the Master’s favorite tool, the rule of law, can never be used to dismantle his house of legal doctrine,475 Erika and the Last Black Hero choose to act through potentially violent revolution.476 If the Master’s oppression is so entrenched and permanent as Bell argues,477 then nonviolent protest, which relies upon changing public opinion and the Master’s heart, would be futile. As Erika and the Last Black Hero both concede, the problem with violent revolution is that the permanent structural power disparities that multiple critical legal movements take for granted,478 by their own admission, doom their violent revolution to failure as well. As the Last Black Hero explained: “Universal black militance would end black people. Whites could not stand it.”479 In fact, Bell’s Last Black Hero conceded that his black militancy was nearly suicidal: Militant black leadership is like being on a bomb squad. It requires confidence in your skills and a courage able to survive the continuing awareness that you’re messing with dynamite, but that someone has to do it. One mistake, and you’re gone! Sometimes you’re gone whether or not you make a mistake.480 At the end of the day, the more radical and pessimistic core assumptions at the heart of critical legal movements such as Bell’s Racial Realism481 are just that: unprovable assumptions.482 They are unprovable because there are simply too many variables to test their veracity. For example, you either believe, along with Bell and Critical Race Theorists, that U.S. racism is structurally permanent and impervious to legal reform, or, along with Wechsler and civil rights advocates, that U.S. racism, while still present in modern American society, can be lessened through the rule of law. In the final analysis, core assumptions like the permanence or impermanence of racism are more about faith than reason or evidence. As Bell recognized with his critical deconstruction of legal doctrine,483 for better or worse, many lawmakers and practicing attorneys in a democracy believe that legal doctrine is the only “real” form of law.484 They unfairly reject critical theoretical legal scholarship as useless.485 Even if they refuse to accept critically deconstructed hypothetical legal doctrine seriously as workable alternatives, they can nevertheless better understand critical legal theoretical concepts when “translated” into legal doctrine. Just as identifying the problem is the necessary prerequisite to solving the problem, Bell’s critical deconstruction of legal doctrine is the necessary prerequisite to Wechsler’s transformative reconstruction of legal doctrine. Above all, Critical Legal Process’s willingness to use legal doctrine symbolically and practically allows people who run the ideological gamut, from well-intentioned but hesitant incremental law reformers to radical critical legal theorists disdainful of the rule of law, to work together to improve the lives of oppressed groups. CONCLUSION In another story, The Ultimate Civil Rights Strategy, Bell acknowledged that the Master’s tool, the rule of law, might be repurposed in a third way to dismantle the Master’s house.486 The Celestial Curia Sisters, immortals who resemble the Greek Muses, 487 left open the hope that this third way might work: “My Curia Sisters,” Geneva [Crenshaw] said, “I . . . confess[] confusion. You warn us that our legal programs are foredoomed to failure, and yet you urge us to continue those very programs because they will create an atmosphere of protest. I must reiterate my fear that this approach will simply perpetuate the pattern of benefit to whites of legal reforms achieved by civil rights litigation intended to help blacks.” [The Curia responded,] “The benefit they bring to all is proof of how potent a weapon your civil rights programs can be in seeking a restructured society. Future campaigns, while seeking relief in traditional forms, should emphasize the chasm between the existing social order and the nation’s ideals. Thus, Sister Geneva, litigation as well as protests and political efforts would pursue reform directly as well as create a continuing tension between what you are and what you might become. Out of this tension may come the insight and imagination necessary to recast the nation’s guiding principles closer to the ideal—for all Americans.”488 Tension understandably leaves us uncomfortable. We crave certainty. Yet with sharply divisive legal and policy issues like race, tension is what helps us escape our confirmation bias echo chamber and make better—dare we say—more objective decisions.489 Critical Legal Process seeks to embrace the continuing tension the Curia identified—between our ideals and our reality—to find a third way to improve legal doctrine. In this sense, Critical Legal Process, like both Bell and Wechsler, cares more about the struggle, the journey, and the process than the eventual destination or outcome. In their own way, both Bell and Wechsler admitted that their tasks ultimately were impossible. In light of the overwhelming power disparity and structural permanence of racism, real racial progress seemed impossible to Bell.490 [FOOTNOTE BEGINS] 490 Bell admitted this during an interview about Faces at the Bottom of the Well. The interviewer quoted this intentionally italicized passage from the book (which eventually became Bell’s Racial Realism Rule): Black people will never gain full equality in this country. Even those herculean efforts we hail as successful will produce no more than temporary “peaks of progress,” short-lived victories that slide into irrelevance as racial patterns adapt in ways that maintain white dominance. This is a hard-to-accept fact that all history verifies. We must acknowledge it, not as a sign of submission, but as an act of ultimate defiance. DERRICK A. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 12 (1992). Bell responded, “Yes. Yes . . . [I]f I had to put down my whole 35 years of working in this, . . . it’s reflected . . . [in] that paragraph . . . [b]ecause if you read nothing else, I think that reflects my experience. Now am I right? I’m not sure. But that is my experience.” Bell, supra note 142. As George Taylor recognized, “[a]t the heart of Derrick Bell’s work lies a conundrum. He argues that racism is permanent, and yet at the same time he insists that the struggle against racism remains worthwhile and valuable.” George H. Taylor, Racism as “The Nation’s Crucial Sin”: Theology and Derrick Bell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269, 269 (2004).[ FOOTNOTE ENDS] Although Wechsler believed that legal doctrinal reform could limit racism, Wechsler also agreed that perfect legal doctrine was impossible.491 Wechsler probably would also concede that it is impossible to eradicate racism. Both Bell and Wechsler found meaning and significance in—as American realist Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated—wearing your heart out in pursuit of the unattainable.492 Wechsler’s famous Neutral Principles address, to which Bell responded, was dedicated to Justice Holmes.493 Wechsler called himself a “jobbist . . . [c]oncerned with competence and . . . intellectual integrity in thinking about law and working about law.”494 Holmes explained about his “imaginary society of jobbists” that “[t]heir job is their contribution to the general welfare and when a man is on that, he will do it better the less he thinks either of himself or his neighbors, and the more he puts all his energy into the problem he has to solve.” 495 For all their considerable ideological disagreement, Bell probably would agree with Wechsler that he too was a jobbist. When it comes to our continuing “American Dilemma”496 of race relations and remediation of past discrimination, we all need to be jobbists. Although Bell and Wechsler disagreed over the content of Brown’s neutral principle,497 both were undoubtedly courageous people. Perhaps Wechsler’s truly neutral principles of law and Bell’s definition of courage share an overlapping vision. Bell defined courage as “a decision you make to act in a way that works through your own fear for the greater good as opposed to pure self-interest. Courage means putting at risk your immediate selfinterest for what you believe is right.”498 Despite his cynicism, Bell acknowledged that people still respected courage and principle: I think that there is, even in our bottom-line society—you know, take care of number one . . . there is a real respect and a regard for individuals who are willing to act on principle, whether it turns out to be right or . . . wrong or misguided.499 To Wechsler, a truly neutral principle of law would satisfy Bell’s definition of courage. Eschewing outcome-determinative self-interest for the greater good of principled legal doctrine makes for the courageous rule of law. We need the courageous rule of law. Perhaps, like Audre Lorde claimed, the Master’s tool will never dismantle his house.500 Perhaps the rule of law will provide only temporary relief but never genuine change. Only time will tell. In the meantime, we can find solace in Derrick Bell’s wise words: “[W]e must not forget that it is our duty to keep looking for an answer, realizing that we may never find it. Our salvation is not in the discovery, but in the search.”

# 1NR

### 1nr - Perm

#### Polarization DA - the Aff only leads to polarization and blocks effective action

Karlsson 13 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Ambivalence, irony, and democracy in the Anthropocene,” *Futures*, http://bit.ly/2lCoG1N]

Steering clear of an environmental collapse will most likely require more integrated forms of social analysis and foresight (Slaughter, 2012). At the same time, there is a tendency in much of the green literature to bring a whole host of existential, political or even spiritual questions into the sustainability equation in ways which basically suggest that either people everywhere undergo a revolution in terms of consciousness or there is no hope for the future (Lewis, 1996:221). No matter how well-intended, such thinking is only likely to reinforce the kind of polarization of worldviews which we are already seeing with regards to climate change (Hoffman, 2011). While it is difficult to not feel a sense of profound loss and sadness over what is that we are doing to the natural world, these kinds of emotions simply do not seem to translate into wider public support for radical environmentalism. According to some political ecologists, this lack of political support is just further proof of a “false consciousness” manufactured by malign elites. True or not, such accusations are in any case not a good starting point for a constructive political debate. A better starting point for environmental politics would be to ask what it would take to reclaim the future as a domain for democratic choice. Only if there is room for public imagination can society fully grasp the width and breadth of the macro-level social choice which the Anthropocene seems to call for. What most of all seems to be needed to restore this kind of imaginative space are genuinely new ideas, ideas that would let us think in novel ways about environmental change, globalization and our own political responsibility for the world. To be fruitful, such ideas must however be at least somewhat psychologically and politically plausible. We live in a world of more than seven billion people and to then say, for instance, that all that global sustainability requires is that “everyone becomes a vegan and stop having children” is simply not helpful as we know that it takes time for social changes to propagate and that lifestyle changes, like eating a vegan diet, are extremely unlikely to become universal within one or two generations. The same is of course even more the case when we think about the prospects of rapid depopulation. Consequently, to be meaningful, it seems reasonable to ask that strategies for long-term sustainability take the pluralism of existing societies as their starting point and focus on constructing narratives that can bridge these differences rather than trying to assume them away through wishful thinking.

#### There’s a timeframe argument on the permutation. Only way to solve climate is to use the tools available within capitalism on the way to socialist transformation.

Aronoff & Denvir 21 [Kate, staff writer at the New Republic, writing fellow at In These Times, Daniel, visiting fellow in International and Public Affairs at Brown Univ, “Capitalism Can’t Fix the Climate Crisis,” *Jacobin*, 08/25/21, <https://jacobinmag.com/2021/08/capitalism-climate-crisis-global-green-new-deal-clean-energy-fossil-fuel-industry>, accessed 08/26/21, JCR]

DD: You write: “My argument in this book is not that capitalism has to end before the world can deal with the climate crisis. Dismantling a centuries-old system of production and distribution, and building a carbon-neutral and worker-owned alternative, is almost certainly not going to happen within the small window of time the world has to avert runaway disaster. The private sector will be a major part of the transition off of fossil fuels. Some people will get rich, and some unseemly actors will be involved. Capitalist production will build solar panels, wind turbines, and electric trains. But whether we deal with climate change or not can’t be held hostage to executives’ ability to turn a profit. To handle this crisis, capitalism will have to be replaced as society’s operating system, setting out goals other than the boundless accumulation of private wealth.” This argument provoked a bit of controversy in the audience a few years back in Chicago when we discussed it on a panel at the Socialism Conference. Both of us would love to live in a socialist world, and we’ve got to continue to fight for one. But why do you think that it’s important for people to understand that we need to deal with climate change before we win an entirely new mode of production? What’s entailed by the conclusion that we need to pursue radical social-democratic reforms on the road to socialism? Is this a theory of how radical social-democratic reforms can lead to socialism? Is it just a reality that the fast-ticking climate clock imposes on us? Or is it some of both? KA: It’s a reality. If the climate crisis were playing out over the course of two hundred, three hundred, or a thousand years, one could have an interesting theoretical debate about whether we should change the system we have and tweak it slightly in order to take on the crisis, or whether we should create an entirely new mode of production and build up a workaround alternative. Unfortunately, we just don’t have that time. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] outlined in its 2018 report on 1.5 degrees Celsius that we had roughly twelve years. That is now nine years in which to rapidly decarbonize the global economy, which is an enormous challenge. In order to meet that ever-shrinking twelve-year window, we have to use the productive system in which we live — which is not my ideal situation, but then again, neither is global warming.

### 1nr - Link

#### The pessimism of the Aff is a self-fulfilling prophecy – progressive idealism that uses liberal democratic institutions to win broad public support for transformative change is key

Karlsson 13 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Ambivalence, irony, and democracy in the Anthropocene,” *Futures*, http://bit.ly/2lCoG1N]

When confronted by, one hand, the unsustainable nature of existing socioeconomic arrangements and, on the other, the radicalism of any meaningful alternative, one possible response is to retreat into post-modern irony (Behler, 1990; Szerszynski, 2007:343). As all irony, it is a stance which requires minimal personal engagement. Instead of taking active responsibility for the future and trying to articulate intelligent ways of moving society forward, such an ironic stance is often characterized by apathy and resignation about the prospects of liberal democracy. While this apathy may be the result of everything from Marxists beliefs about the impossibility of political comprise to neoliberal opposition towards democratic agency, the result is surprisingly similar. For one reason or the other, the idea of radical democratic change is rejected and replaced with irony and political procrastination. Instead of idealism we find a growing cynicism, a cynicism which in itself is then often used to prove the impossibility of idealism. While passivity towards the future is nothing new (prior to the Enlightenment, it was in many ways the default orientation), it is in a way a paradoxical stance given how profoundly humanity has proven capable of reshaping its own social conditions over the last couple of centuries. Much has been written about why we, despite all the evidence of the opposite, have come to in this manner lose faith in our ability to democratically shape the future (Johnson, 2004; Nassehi, 1994). Beyond all elaborate attempts to explain the exhaustion of our utopian energies, a very simple answer could be a genuine lack of political imagination. While there is definitely no shortage of radical ideas per se, what is missing is convincing socioeconomic theories and intelligent stories about how to make transformative change possible in a pluralist world. Instead of developing such new unifying theories capable of winning broad democratic support, many academics have been drawn into critical theory in a way that has undermined their own ability to draw qualitative political distinctions and left them simply convinced that “the whole is false” (Bronner, 1999:181). Outside academia, conspiracy theories and other alternative epistemologies have come to play a similar role in undermining political subjectivity and the sense of collective responsibility for the future. While it is true that the Enlightenment itself always advocated moderation and toleration with its sceptical attacks on all human presumptions (just think of Voltaire), it was still founded on an unfailing commitment to social progress and the advancement of human civilization. Lacking that progressive commitment, many contemporary social theorists seem to rather take pride in their own marginalization and the futility of their “resistance” against the neoliberal hegemony.

### 1nr AT: Degrowth

#### Degrowth would cause public scapegoating and make environmental problems worse

Karlsson 16 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “The Environmental Risks of Incomplete Globalization,” *Globalizations*, http://bit.ly/2jS3RNS]

Yet, despite the remarkable scientific advancements of the last centuries, or even decades, Malthusians tend to reject the very possibility of universal affluence and what they pejoratively refer to as a “techno-fix” (Huesemann & Huesemann, 2011). Instead of uncertain technological innovation they like to see deep social changes, essentially a far-reaching epistemological homogenisation by which people everywhere adopt strict regimes of frugality and simplicity. However, just as the solution to the contradictions of capitalism in the 1930’s was neither individual moral reform of the capital-owners nor a socialist revolution of society as a whole but rather the institutionalisation of welfare-capitalism and liberal democracy, it seems far wiser to accept the existence of a pluralist society with competing conceptions of the good life and rather focus on applying technology in a conscious way to overcome environmental determinism. Obviously, this is also a question of political tactics. While ecosocialist literature tends to think of capitalism in the 21st century as a mere elite project, it seems fair to say that the logic of capital accumulation has become almost universal today with widely shared material aspirations reaching from home ownership to international travel. Similarly, large groups in the OECD-economies either have retired already or will do so in the coming decades with considerable expectations in terms of retirement income. Failure to deliver on these pension expectations would probably create a state of political crisis in which the “immigrants” but also the “environment” would be easy targets. For these, and many other reasons, it is not surprising that political elites remain deeply wedded to the idea of economic growth. Yet, insufficient demand due to rising inequality and a lack of social investments have made it difficult to deliver that growth. In the best of worlds, the need for growth could hypothetically make policy-makers more willing to challenge the prevailing supply-side paradigm but also consider the benefits of accelerating globalisation (or at least keeping them away from enacting protectionist measures). While it is obvious that economic growth does not benefit everyone equally, and that it can be source of environmental destruction, the same can be said about the lack of growth. A secular stagnation or even degrowth is certainly no guarantee for environmental protection or greater equality. If anything, the rich are likely to try to isolate themselves even more from the rest of society

#### Degrowth fails on all levels: there’s no transition because of entrenched value systems, and even if there were, it would result in ecological devastation and authoritarian violence and homogenization

Karlsson 13 [Rasmus, Senior lecturer in Political Science at Umea University, “Ambivalence, irony, and democracy in the Anthropocene,” *Futures*, http://bit.ly/2lCoG1N]

It is for these reasons that effective degrowth (Trainer, 2012) would presumably have to include everything from far-reaching restrictions on reproductive rights (Alcott, 2012) to near-authoritarian forms of socioeconomic steering (Beeson, 2010). Projected onto the international scene, the implementation of such an agenda would require extensive ethical agreement and also a willingness on behalf of the poor to voluntarily forfeit their aspirations of a living standard similar to the one in the rich world. It does not take an overly critical mind to doubt the plausibility of many of these conditions, especially in a world of interstate competition and conflicting norm systems. Any everyday conversation in, say, the United States or China will reveal what a fundamental shift of all social values it is that is actually implied in the concept of degrowth. Whether such a sea change is at all possible remains difficult to tell but, if anything, recent trends seem to point in the opposite direction with increasing scepticism regarding the science of climate change and a fundamental unwillingness to accept individual sacrifices (such as higher gasoline taxes) on behalf of the global environment (Jamieson, 2006; Whitmarsh, 2011). Apart from the imagined reversal of all social priorities, a possibly even bigger obstacle is the lack of compelling socio-economic theories which characterizes much eco-socialist thinking. Little if anything is known about how production decisions are to be made without price signals, how processes of functional differentiation and specialization are to be reversed if international trade is wound down and how (if at all) political dissent is to be accommodated. The most common response to such concerns is to suggest that existing constitutional frameworks and market institutions are to be maintained but that they should, somehow, be made less exploitative and environmental destructive in nature. But if that is so, that brings us back to what seems to be a fundamental dilemma confronting any degrowth agenda: if change is not radical, it will most likely not deliver long-term sustainability and, if it is radical, it will also mean a sharp break with existing liberal-democratic practices. Before turning to the possible implications of this dilemma, it seems appropriate to examine the other principle solution to the problem of sustainability, namely that, instead of trying to enforce the planetary boundaries, we should seek to permanently lift these limits through technological evolution. As a first preliminary observation, it seems reasonable to be extremely careful not to underestimate the magnitude of technological change called for in order to permanently transcend all planetary biophysical limits, especially if we assume a future world of universal affluence with a population similar to ours. In theory we can at a minimum imagine three different necessary elements of such a strategy: (a) a gradual decoupling from the natural world through space colonization, (b) a revolutionary change to the metabolism of our societies through molecular engineering and productive nanosystems and (c) the invention of new technologies capable of providing abundant and inexpensive energy (Hoffert et al., 2002; Williams et al., 2012). While it is difficult to say in any detail what an optimal balance between these elements would look like, each element seems called for in order to make possible everything from climate stabilization to habitat preservation while allowing an accelerating rate of human development. If we ignore the possible emergence of a technological singularity (Kurzweil, 2005) or other sudden breaks with all previous experience, it should be obvious that we are still many decades away from developing the kind of technology required to make such a future possible (Galiana & Green, 2010:37). It may even be that, while we are undoubtedly making progress in some areas such as nanoengineering or in the material sciences, we are actually moving further away from such a future as manned space programmes are closed down and funding for energy R&D is directed towards expensive low-energy technologies such as wind power rather than towards technologies that one day hypothetically could provide abundant and inexpensive energy at the scale needed for universal affluence (Karlsson, 2012b). Just as it seems reasonable to be cautious about the political prospects of radical environmentalism, it seems doubtful that the countries of the world would suddenly embrace any radical agenda for innovation. Not only is the kind of high-modernist imagination which brought about the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Program strikingly absent in contemporary political discourses about sustainability, cash-strapped economies also seem to offer little room for bold and uncertain long-term investments. For all lip service about the role of innovation in securing environmental sustainability, few politicians tend to look beyond their own national borders and ask how their country could contribute in any substantial manner towards making universal affluence ecologically possible. Likewise, the academic discourse on ecological modernization has predominately emphasized marginal improvements to industrial processes and energy use at home rather than the need to develop entirely new breakthrough technologies for the rest of the world. In light of this, but also more general anti-utopian sentiments, we should not be surprised by how little systematic attention that has been paid to the long-term prospects of the human enterprise and to what extent it may be possible to democratically decide the future course of technological evolution. Expressed in metaphoric terms, there seems to be good reasons to question the political credentials of both Ecotopia and StarTrek as strategies for sustainability. This would be of little concern if we were confident that more pragmatic forms of change would suffice to protect the natural environment while making possible human development on a global scale, yet it is precisely this ability that is in doubt. Although decades of piecemeal ecological modernization have delivered substantial improvements in terms of eco-efficiency and the Environmental Kuznets Curve does seem to hold for a range of local environmental indicators such as urban air quality (Dinda, 2004), overall environmental destruction continues at a staggering rate at the global level (York, Rosa & Dietz, 2003). Greenhouse gas emissions in particular continue to rise with few signs of stabilization as hundred millions of new consumers in Asia, but also in other parts of the world such as Brazil, are joining the world market (Sheehan, 2008). While we cannot know with absolute certainty how sensitive the climate system is to changes in radiative forcing (Rahmstorf, 2008) or how much anthropogenic pressure it will actually take to cause a global state shift with irreversible and abrupt biotic effects (Barnosky et al., 2012), it is fairly uncontroversial that there are at least some aggregate limits to what nature can withstand. In light of this, it seems highly irresponsible to not ensure the kind of safety margins discussed above. Conceptualized in relation to the two principle options for achieving sustainability, we can think of this need for safety margins in the Anthropocene as a kind of civilizational bifurcation since whichever option is chosen, it should be done with sufficient determination so that the human enterprise remains well within its safe operating space with respect to the Earth system (Rockström et al., 2009). On a schematic level, this means that to avoid an acute state of unsustainability, we should either (A) seek to accelerate the innovation rate enough to achieve sustainability through advanced technologies or (B) reduce the global metabolism sufficiently to achieve sustainability through degrowth: Visualized in the figure above, this highlights the risk of “falling in between”. Simply put, this means that if we lack the political determination necessary to successfully pursue either strategy, we may find ourselves sliding unintentionally into an escalating, and possibly irreversible, state of unsustainability. To better understand that risk, we must in turn consider the deep-felt ambivalence which characterizes much contemporary thinking about the modern world, the ironic response that radical visions of the future tend to provoke and the democratic implications of these issues. In many ways, ambivalence is a very sensible reaction towards the problématique of the Anthropocene. As encouraging as the steady improvements in human welfare and health have been (both infant mortality and illiteracy have halved over the last forty years), rising prosperity has also meant billions of more animals shackled in factory farms, the destruction of natural habitats everywhere and creeping doubts about the long-term sustainability of the human enterprise (Goldin, 2011). Meanwhile, academic philosophers have been quick to point out the socially destructive effects of development itself and the loss of authenticity, meaning and belonging that it is thought to have given rise to (Taylor, 1992). While it is important to consider also the other side of these processes, as in the emancipation from parochial forms of social control and greater individual self-determination (Luke & Munshi, 2011), it is still not uncommon to hear that such advancements will never become universal or that the whole global order is inevitably premised on exploitation. Even if it may be theoretically simple to refute such views and to show that, whatever short-term gains that can be had through exploitation, the prospects of long-term global growth rather depend on that more and more people will be able to contribute with their creativity and imagination to the world economy, few scholars seem capable of fully realizing the potential of a world with, say, four billion university graduates. Instead of focusing on the possibilities of such a world and actively seek its realization, most authors in the environmental field have come to fear the rising poor and focus exclusively on the risks of consumption (Cafaro, 2012; Myers and Kent, 2003). Overall, there seems to be a profound mismatch between how much we discuss the risks of the future compared with how little we talk about the possibilities of a global modernity. Part of this may have to do with something as simple as the intangible nature of many of the technological advances that would be necessary to make such a future ecologically sustainable. While it, at least on a schematic level, was fairly straightforward to imagine how an automobile, an airplane or a fridge worked and their benefits were immediately observable for everyone, the same is hardly the case when we think about nanotechnologies, space elevators or other elements of a technoscientific future (Davies, 2011). In addition, popular culture has long been filled with frightening images of advanced technologies gone wrong and, in particular, the risks associated with the emergence of self-conscious machine intelligence (just think of Battlestar Galactica, The Matrix or The Terminator franchise). While some of these risks definitely warrant our consideration (Bostrom & Cirkovic, 2008; Hansson, 2004), they have to be weighed against the very real risks resulting from our current state of technological immaturity. If it is common to feel apprehension about the prospects of accelerating technological change, the same is of course also true about any suggestions that modernity should be reversed or, even at some point in the future, dismantled in its entirety (Zerzan, 2008). For all its shortcomings, few people would seriously consider trading the comforts of modern life for any future primitivist vision (Arias-Maldonado, 2012:117). Not only is the logic of capital accumulation probably far more entrenched than some academic philosophers tend to think, it is obvious that many people genuinely value access to advanced medicine, the freedom to travel or the possibility of retirement. It is also important to remember that, for all the rhetoric, the recent “anti-capitalist” protests in Spain and elsewhere have essentially been protests in favour of more equal opportunities and greater inclusion in he economic system rather than calls to abolish the whole notion of, say, paid employment. Given the lack of apparent appetite for either an acceleration of modernity or a reversal of its fundamental dynamics, it is not surprising that some people have found themselves attracted to the idea of a “zero-growth” economy. Yet, even if we assume that it would somehow be politically possible to slow the expansion rate of the economy that would not in itself reduce the environmental impact generated by the already existing level of economic activity. In this sense, there is nothing particular magic about the number zero and, as discussed above, effective degrowth would probably have to amount to a far more substantial reduction of economic activity. When confronted by, one hand, the unsustainable nature of existing socioeconomic arrangements and, on the other, the radicalism of any meaningful alternative, one possible response is to retreat into post-modern irony (Behler, 1990; Szerszynski, 2007:343). As all irony, it is a stance which requires minimal personal engagement. Instead of taking active responsibility for the future and trying to articulate intelligent ways of moving society forward, such an ironic stance is often characterized by apathy and resignation about the prospects of liberal democracy. While this apathy may be the result of everything from Marxists beliefs about the impossibility of political comprise to neoliberal opposition towards democratic agency, the result is surprisingly similar. For one reason or the other, the idea of radical democratic change is rejected and replaced with irony and political procrastination. Instead of idealism we find a growing cynicism, a cynicism which in itself is then often used to prove the impossibility of idealism. While passivity towards the future is nothing new (prior to the Enlightenment, it was in many ways the default orientation), it is in a way a paradoxical stance given how profoundly humanity has proven capable of reshaping its own social conditions over the last couple of centuries. Much has been written about why we, despite all the evidence of the opposite, have come to in this manner lose faith in our ability to democratically shape the future (Johnson, 2004; Nassehi, 1994). Beyond all elaborate attempts to explain the exhaustion of our utopian energies, a very simple answer could be a genuine lack of political imagination. While there is definitely no shortage of radical ideas per se, what is missing is convincing socioeconomic theories and intelligent stories about how to make transformative change possible in a pluralist world. Instead of developing such new unifying theories capable of winning broad democratic support, many academics have been drawn into critical theory in a way that has undermined their own ability to draw qualitative political distinctions and left them simply convinced that “the whole is false” (Bronner, 1999:181). Outside academia, conspiracy theories and other alternative epistemologies have come to play a similar role in undermining political subjectivity and the sense of collective responsibility for the future. While it is true that the Enlightenment itself always advocated moderation and toleration with its sceptical attacks on all human presumptions (just think of Voltaire), it was still founded on an unfailing commitment to social progress and the advancement of human civilization. Lacking that progressive commitment, many contemporary social theorists seem to rather take pride in their own marginalization and the futility of their “resistance” against the neoliberal hegemony. If ambivalence and irony are expected reactions towards the challenges posed by the Anthropocene, what does that say about our chances of making any macro-level social choice with regards to sustainability? On the surface of it, a seemingly plausible answer could be the one provided by postecological theorists like Ingolfur Blühdorn who argue that, despite the rhetoric of seriousness employed when talking about global environmental change, both voters and politicians are committed to avoid any authentic form of eco-politics which would seriously challenge the core principles of consumer capitalism (Blühdorn, 2007). Such an answer however is premised on the view that, at the end of the day, everyone knows what “authentic eco-politics” would actually look like in a globalizing world. It is for instance not uncommon to hear people take small examples of individual environmental stewardship (such as growing your own vegetables rather than buying food in supermarkets) and believe that these changes, written large, would automatically amount to meaningful strategies for global sustainability (Karlsson, 2012a). The problem with this view is that we, on reflection, know very well that a radical and unplanned decentralization of the economy would lead to utter ecological devastation. Just the thought of seven billion people walking out in nature in search of food and fuel should be sufficient to prove the absurdity in believing that a civilizational collapse would in any way amount to sustainability. Instead, it should be immediate clear that, to be successful, any degrowth agenda would have to be very carefully orchestrated at the global level and, once implemented, would also have to be enforced indefinitely to prevent new unsustainable patterns from spontaneously emerging. For a movement seeking such comprehensive social changes, political ecologists have shown remarkably little interest in what kind of political backlash that such an environmental regime could potentially provoke or how international coordination is to be sustained over time, something that would seem to require near absolute epistemological and ethical homogenization in a world as populous as ours. In fact, much green political theorizing seems to take place far away from any real-world political conversation. While it may be possible to imagine how gradually growing ecological consciousness may lead to the globalization of more stringent environmental laws (Mol, 2007) or greater measures of personal environmental responsibility (Dobson, 2003), it is indeed very difficult to imagine how for instance Cuban agroecology could in any way be a model for a global future (Boillat, Gerber & FunesMonzote, 2012). In a world still reeling from one of the worst financial crisis in modern history, it seems almost impossible to think that politicians would seek further voluntarily reductions in commerce and trade. Considering the number of crises that the capitalist economic system has survived in the past, it also seems highly speculative to think that this will mark the end of consumer capitalism as we know it. If anything, it may lead to the very opposite as in an even stronger desire to revive growth, regardless of the environmental consequences. Instinctively sceptical of big science and rejecting the need for massive research investments in for instance the nuclear field, many political ecologists seemed to have hoped that the seriousness of climate change would have led to reduced energy consumption and an increasing willingness to pay for expensive low carbon technologies such as wind power. While this may have been true for a few ecological leaders such as Sweden (Söderholm, Ek & Pettersson, 2007), the rest of the world seems to have been following a very different track towards further carbon-lock in (Unruh & Carrillo-Hermosilla, 2006) with increasing focus on oil sands, shale gas fracking, and offshore drilling. Without sufficient public investments in breakthrough technologies such as nuclear fusion, commercial interests appear set on autonomously developing far more practical and dirtier sources of energy.

#### Tech and innovation makes growth sustainable – economics overcomes limits

Beth Haynes, Professor of Economics at Brigham Young University, Hawaii, 8-19-2008, “Finite Resources vs. Infinite Resourcefulness,” http://wealthisnottheproblem.blogspot.com/2008/08/finite-resources-vs-infinite.html

Our consumption is excessive. If we continue to consume our natural resources, there will be nothing left for the future. Use less. Do it for the children! Limit. Limit. Limit. Do it for the poor! A significant number of environmental concerns center on this fear of using up some important resource: oil, rainforest, fresh water, open space, biodiversity. The concern is genuine. The fears are real. People then work to pass laws which intentionally slow production and hinder (even prevent) consumption. The express purpose is to make us poorer in the short run with the hope of preventing poverty in the long run. It’s common sense. Save today in order to have some available tomorrow. It’s how our bank accounts work, so it seems logical to apply the same reasoning to resource use. But there is a catch. All of economic history, up to and including today, demonstrates that the more we exploit our natural resources, the more available they become. (3-7) How can this possibly be? If we use our “limited, non-renewable resources” we have to end up with less, right? Actually, no. And here is why. We don’t simply “use up” existing resources; we constantly create them. We continually invent new processes, discover new sources, improve the efficiency of both use and extraction, while at the same time we discover cheaper, better alternatives. The fact that a particular physical substance is finite is irrelevant.

What is relevant is the process of finding ways to meet human needs and desires. The solutions, and thus what we consider resources, are constantly changing. Oil was a nuisance, not a resource, until humans discovered a use for it. In order to survive and flourish, human beings must succeed at fulfilling certain needs and desires. This can be accomplished in a multitude of ways using a multitude of materials. The requirements of life set the goals. How these goals are met does not depend on the existence or the availability of any particular material. Limits are placed not by the finiteness of a physical substance, but by the extent of our knowledge, of our wealth, and of our freedom. Knowledge. Wealth. Freedom. These are the factors which are essential to solving the problems we face. “The Stone Age didn’t end because we ran out of stones.” (8) Think for a minute about how we have solved the problem of meeting basic needs throughout history: Transportation: from walking to landing on the moon Communication: from face-to-face conversations to the World Wide Web. Food: from hunting and gathering to intravenous feeding and hydroponics. Shelter: from finding a cave to building skyscrapers Health care: from shamans to MRIs and neurosurgery. How does progress happen? A synopsis of the process is provided by the main theme of Julian Simon’s book, The Ultimate Resource 2: More people, and increased income, cause resources to become more scarce in the short run. Heightened scarcity causes prices to rise. The higher prices present opportunity and prompt inventors and entrepreneurs to search for solutions. Many fail in the search, at cost to themselves. But in a free society, solutions are eventually found. And in the long run, the new developments leave us better off than if the problems had not arisen, that is, prices eventually become lower than before the scarcity occurred. (9) This idea is not just theory. Economists and statisticians have long been analyzing the massive amounts of data collected on resource availability. The conclusion: our ability to solve the problems of human existence is ever-expanding. Resources have become less scarce and the world is a better place to live for more and more people. (3-7) Overall, we create more than we destroy as evidenced by the steady progress in human well being and there is no evidence for concluding that this trend can't and won't continue. Doomsday predictions have been with us since ancient times and they have consistently been proven wrong.